Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

1988

Bear River Mutual Insurance Company v. Robert
Wright and Mark Martinez : Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Thomas A. Duffin; Spafford, Dibb, Duffin and Jensen; attorneys for repsondent.
Robert J. Debry, G. Steven Sullivan; attorneys for appellant.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Bear River Mutual v. Wright, No. 880249.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1988).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/2208

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
BRIEF
UTAH
DOCUMENT
KF U
50
DOCKET NO.
IN THE SUPREME COURT! FOR THE
STATE OF UTAH

BEAR RIVER MUTUAL
INSURANCE COMPANY,
Respondent,

88-0249-CA
C^se No. 880579

ROBERT WRIGHT, and
MARK MARTINEZ.

Cbt-^ :

i,

Appellant,
CORRECTED BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Rbbert J. DeBry
G. Steven Sullivan
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Appellant
4001 South 70 0 East,
Fifth Floor
Slalt. Lake City, Utah
84107

Thomas A.
SPAFFORD,
Attorneys
311 South
Salt Lake.

Duffin
D1BB, DUFFIN & JENSEN
for Respondent
State, Suite 380
City, Utah
84111

I

I fmrm f^**. %^Jf

JUN1 1987
Clerk, Supreme Court, Utah

IN THE SUPREME COURT FOR THE
STATE OF UTA^H
i

BEAR RIVER MUTUAL
INSURANCE COMPANY,
Respondent,
I

Case No. 860579

vs.
ROBERT WRIGHT, and
MARK MARTINEZ,

]i

Category No.

14b

Appellant.
CORRECTED BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Rbbert J. DeBry
G. Steven Sullivan
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Appellant
4001 South 700 East,
Fifth Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah
84107

Thomas A.
SPAFFORD,
Attorneys
311 South
Salt Lake

Duffin
DIBB, DUFFIN & JENSEN
for Respondent
State, Suite 380
City, Utah
84111

TAELE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
STATEMENT OF ISSUES FOR REVIEW

1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

1

FACTS

2

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

4

ARGUMENT

5

POINT I: THE SUBJECT EXCLUSIONARY CLAUSE
CONTRADICTS THE MINIMUM CONVERAGE SET
FORTH BY THE UTAH STATUTES ON UINSURED
MOTORIST PROTECTION.
A.

This Court Has Previously Rejected
Attempts to Contravene the Minimum
Automobile Insurance Coverage Set
Out bv Statute,

B.

The Fact That Wright Was Driving
His Uninsured Motorcycle at the
Time of the Crash Does Not Justify
The Exclusionary Clause

10

The Vast Majority of State Courts
Which Have Reviewed the Exclusionary
Clause Have Struck It Down as
Violative of Public Policy

11

C.

POINT II: THE EXCLUSIONARY CLAUSE DOES NOT
INCLUDE MOTORCYCLES WITHIN ITS TERMS AND
COVERAGE EXISTS UNDER THE FACTS

12

POINT III: IN THE EVENT THE EXCLUSIONARY
CLAUSE IS STRUCK DOWN, A SET-OFF CANNOT
BE TAKEN FOR BENEFITS MADE UNDER THE
NO-FAULT PORTION OF THE POLICY

14

CONCLUSION

15

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES

Page

American Casualty Company of Redding Penn. v. Eagle
Star Insurance Co. , 568 P.2d 731 (Utah 1977)

14

Bachus v. Farmers Ins. Group Exchange,
475 P.2d 264 (Ariz. 1970)

15

Bass v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co.,
128 Ga.App. 285 196 S.E.2d 485, modified,
231 Ga. 269, 201 S.E.2d 444 (1973)

11

Bell v. State Farm Mutl. Auto. Ins. Co.,
157 W.Va. 623, 207 S.E.2d 147 (Utah 1974)

12

Calvert v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Arizona,
697 P.2d 684 (Ariz. 1985)

11

Cannon v. American Underwriters Inc.,
150 Ind.App. 21, 275 N.E.2d 567 (Indr 1971)

11

Coates v. American Economy Ins. Co.,
627 P.2d 92 (Utah 1981)
Dhane v. Trinity Universal Ins. Co.,
497 S.W.2d 323 (Txl973)

7

+

Doxtater v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,
8 Ill.App.3d 547, 290 N.E.2d 284 (111. 1972)
Elledge v. Warren,
263 So.2d 912 (La.App. 1972) ,
Farmers Insurance Exchange v. Call,
712 P.2d 231 (Utah 1985)
Jacobson v. Implement Dealers Mutual Insurance Co.,
640 P.2d 908 (Mont. 1982)
Mullis v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co.,
252 So.2d 229 (Fla. 1971)

15
11
10,11
8
11,12
11

Nygaard v. State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co.,
221 N.W.2d 151 (Minn. 1974)

11,12

Scow v. Farmers Insurance Company,
Civil No. C80-0121, unpublished (1980)

9

Shearer v. Motorists Mutual Ins. Co.,
371 N.E.2d 210 (Ohio, 1978)
State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co. v. Hinkeli
488 P.2d 1151 (Nev. 1971)

11

State Farm Automobile Insurance Co. v. Reaves,
292 Ala. 218, 292 So.2d 95 (Ala. 1974)..
State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Robertson,
156 Ind.App. 149, 295 N.E.2d 626 (Ind 1973)...
Thamert v. Continental Casualty Company,
621 P.2d 702 (Utah 1980)
Tullev v. State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co.,
345 F.Supp. 1123 (D.C., W.Va. 1972).,
STATUTES:
Utah Code Annotated, §41-12-21

,

Utah Code Annotated, §41-12-21.1

,

OTHER AUTHORITIES!
1984 Arizona State Law Journal 814-884, Fall 1984,
EXHIBITS:
1.

Utah Code Annotated, §41-12-21

2.

Utah Code Annotated, §41-12-21.1

3.

Bear River Policy

4.

Scow v. Farmers Ins. Co., Civil No. C80-0121,
unpublished (C.Dist. for U.S. Dist of Utah 1980)

5.

Calvert v. Farmers Ins. Co., 697 P.2d, 684 (Ariz. 1985

6.

Jacobson v. Implement Dealers Mutual Ins. Co., 6 40 P.2d
908 (Mont 1982)

STATEMENT OF ISSUES FOR REVIEW
1.

Should

an

insured

motorist

be

denied

uninsured motorist coverage when driving an owned motorcycle
not listed on the policy when such exclusion is not part of
state law?
2.

Do the policy definitions dealing with the

subject exclusion exempt owned motorcycles

to allow for

uninsured motorist coverage when the insured is injured on
such vehicle?
3.
violate

In the event the subject exclusion is held to

public

policy,

should

the

uninsured

motorist

benefits be reduced by earlier paid out no-fault benefits?

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Respondent Bear River Mutual

Insurance Company

(herafter "Bear River") brought this declaratory judgment
action to determine the effectiveness of an exclusionary
clause.
Appellant Robert Wright (hereafter "Wright") was
injured when involved in an accident between an uninsured
motorist and himself.

Mr. Wright was driving a motorcycle

owned by him but not listed on his automobile policy.

Mr.

Wright's request for uninsured motorist benefits resulted in
this declaratory action.

Eoth parties filed motions for summary
concerning the validity of the exclusion.
upheld

the

exclusion

finding

it did

not

judgment

The lower court
violate

public

policy.

FACTS

The Accident.

The accident occurred on April 28,

1985, at the intersection of 2820 South 7200 West, Salt Lake
County, Utah.

Wright was driving a 1982 Honda motorcycle

owned by him.

The other driver, Mark Martinez, was stopped

westbound
light.

at a stop sign.

Wright had a yellow

(R.194, Depo of App., pp.19-20.)

flashing

As Wright drove

into the intersection, Mr. Martinez darted into the intersection, broadsiding Wright (R.194, Depo of App., p.20.)
The

Injuries.

Wright

was

thrown

across

the

intersection and over an adjoining chain link fence (R.194,
Depo

of

App., p.28.)

twenty-five
suffered

minutes

and

injury

right hip resulted.
collapsed

suffered.

was

(R.914,

three broken ribs

Contusions

kidney,

Wright

Depo

unconscious
of

App.,

for
p.28.)

about
He

(R.194, Depo of App., p.36.)

to his left ankle, right knee and

(R.194, Depo of App., p.36.)
lung

and

cervical

injuries

A bruised
were

also

(R.194, Depo of App., p.37.)
The

Insurance.

On

or

about

January

(prior to the accident), Bear River issued

2

15, 1985,

to Wright an

automobile insurance policy.

(R.2-3.)

Said policy provided

for uninsured motorist benefits up to $20,000 for bodily
injury (R.4.)

Said policy was in effect at the time of this

accident.
Bear River would be obligated to provide Wright
uninsured motorist benefits but for the contested policy
exclusion.

(R.3.)

That

is, ther^ is no

argument that

uninsured motorist coverage is owing, but for the exclusion.
The exclusionary clause excuses uninsured motorist protection

when

the

insured

is

injured

while

occupying

an

automobile (other than an insured automobile) owned by the
named insured (R.4.)
Wright

requested

and

received

PIP

(no-fault)

benefits from Bear River for the injuries suffered in the
accident.

(R.194, Depo of App., p.53U)
Counsel has stipulated and Bear River has asserted

that for purposes of this action, Mark Martinez is assumed
to be an uninsured motorist (R.4-5.)

Wright has testified

that Mark Martinez admitted to having no auto insurance at
the time of the accident (R.194, Depo or App., p.23.)
The Contested Court Decision.
this

declaratory

Declaratory

judgment

Judgment

Act

action
(R.2.)

Bear River filed

pursuant
The

to

Honorable

the

Utah

Timothy

Hansen, ruled the subject exclusion did not violate public
policy and held said exclusion enforceable.

3

(R.186.)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

mandates

The

Motor

all

Utah

Vehicle

Safety

resident

Responsibility

drivers

levels of automobile insurance.

maintain

Act

prescribed

Included in this statutory

mandate is uninsured motorist coverage.

(Section 41-12-21

and 41-12-21.1, U.C.A, as amended, See Exhibits 1 and 2.)
This statutory mandate included

specific exclusions which

might appear in Utah automobile policies.
The

Utah

uninsured

motorist

statute

provides

coverage to insured persons for bodily injury, sickness or
death resulting

from the acts of owners or operators of

uninsured motor vehicles.
The language of the Act clearly extends coverage
to all insured persons —
motorist

coverage

extends

not vehicles I
to

insured

That is, uninsured
persons

whether

on

foot, bike or car.
Included in Bear River's automobile policy is an
exclusion

avoiding

uninsured

motorist

coverage

when

the

insured is injured while in an owned automobile other than
the insured automobile.
This

exclusion

conditions

uninsured

motorist

coverage on the vehicle involved in the accident, not the
injured person.

This exclusion results in auto insurance

coverage

which

does

not

meet

minimum.

The exclusion violates state law and is void.

4

the

prescribed

statutory

Recognition

of

the

subject

exclusion

requires

treating uninsured motorist coverage as a risk policy*

That

is, an assumption must be made that by excluding uninsured
owned

automobiles, a carrier

presumably its premiums.

is reducing

its

risk and

This is ap incorrect assumption.

Utah uninsured motorist coverage follows the person not the
vehicle.
risk.

There is no effective way to base premiums on

The exclusion has no rational basis.
Bear River should be prevented from setting off

from uninsured motorist coverage amounts paid out under the
Utah no-fault

law.

Such set-off would again result in

automobile insurance coverage which does not meet the Utah
statutory minimum.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE SUBJECT EXCLUSIONARY CLAUSE CONTRADICTS
THE MINIMUM COVERAGE SET FORTH BY THE UTAH
STATUTES ON UNINSURED MOTORIST PROTECTION
The Utah Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act
was written to cover the .insured automobile and insured
driver.

See, Section 41-12-21(b)(lj and

amended 1953.

(See Exhibit 1.)

(2), U.C.A., as

That statute specifically

requires coverage for both the person and automobile.
That statute also prescribes what exclusions and
additions

may

be

made

to

the

5

minimum

coverage.

See

41-12-21 (f), (g) , (h) , (i) , (j) and (k) , U.C.A. as amended
1953.

(Exhibit 1.)
The Utah uninsured motorist statute applicable at

the time is found at Section 41-12-21.1, U.C.A, as amended
1953.

The coverage mandated by the law is clear and inclu-

sive.

Unlike the liability statute, the uninsured motorist

coverage

extends

automobile.

to the

insured

person, not

the

It reads:

Commencing on July 1, 1967, no automobile liability insurance policy insuring
against loss resulting from liability
imposed by law for bodily injury or
death or property damage suffered by any
person arising out of the ownership,
maintenance or use of a motor vehicle,
shall be delivered, issued for delivery,
or renewed in this state, with respect
to any motor vehicle registered or
principally
garaged
in this state,
unless coverage is provided' in such
policy or a supplement to it, in limits
for bodily injury or death set forth in
section 41-12-5, under provisions filed
with and approved by the state insurance
commission for the protection of persons
insured
thereunder who
are
legally
entitled to recover damages from owners
or operators of uninsured motor vehicles
and hit-and-run motor vehicles because
of bodily injury, sickness or disease,
including death, resulting therefrom.
The named insured shall have the right
to reject such coverage, and unless the
names insured requests such coverage in
writing, such coverage need not be
provided in a renewal policy or a
supplement to it where the names insured
had rejected the coverage in connection
with a policy previously issued to him
by the same insurer. [Emphasis added.]

6

insured

The

policy

issued

by

exclusions to the uninsured coverage.

Bear

River

included

The subject exclusion

is as follows:
Exclusions: This [uninsured motorist]
policy does not apply under Part IV:
(a) to bodily injury t0 an insured
while
occupying
an
automobile
(other than an insured automobile)
owned by the named insured or a
relative, or through being struck
by
such an automobile.
(See
Exhibit 3.)
The exclusionary clause shifts the focus of the
uninsured coverage from the insured person to the insured
automobile.

In so doing, the coverage provided by the

subject policy falls well below th£ coverage mandated by
Utah law.
A.

This Court Has Previously Rejected Attempts to Contravene the Minimum Automobile Insurance Coverage Set Out
by Statute.
This court has consistently upheld the Utah Motor

Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act as providing the minimum
coverage a Utah resident can purchase. The Court has struck
down attempts by various insurance companies to provide less
coverage than mandated by Utah law.
In Coates v. American Economy Insurance Company,
627 P.2d

92

(Utah

1981), this Court held

an insured's

automobile no-fault benefits was payable to that person
while driving an owned motorcycle not listed on the policy.

7

This Court held the Utah no-fault law provided benefits for:
Personal
injuries
sustained
by
the
insured when injured in an accident in
this state involving any motor vehicle.
As in this action, Utah law called for the insurance to follow the person, not the insured automobile.
In Thamert v. Continental Casualty Company, 621
P. 2d

702

(Utah

1980),

insurance

company

coverage,

payments

compensation
uninsured

to

set-off

earlier

policy.

motorist

allowed by

this Court declined

law.

made

This

law

court

set

A set-off

from

forth

to

uninsured
under

again
the

a
held

minimum

allow

the

motorist
workmen's
the

Utah

coverage

for other amounts paid would

reduce the uninsured motorist protection below that level
mandated by Utah law.
In Farmers Insurance Exchange v. Call, 712 P.2d
231 (Utah 1985), the insurance company filed a declaratory
judgment action.
over her child.
guardian.

Earlier, Mrs. Call had negligently

run

The boy sued his mother through the legal

Farmers Insurance, the Call carrier, was request-

ed to defend the suit and pay out any damages sustained
pursuant to the auto policy.
a

policy

exclusion

contractual duties.

Farmers Insurance argued that

excused

them

from

filling

their

The exclusion exempted coverage to an

insured for liability to a household member.

8

This

court

rational basis.

held

the

exclusion

was

without

a

The Court found the exclusion contravened

the Utah statute by providing less coverage than required by
Utah law.

This Court held the exclusion violated public

policy and void at least up to the minimum coverage required
by Utah law.
As

in Call, the

rational basis.

subject exclusion

As discussed

coverage is not risk related.
insured person.

is without

below, uninsured

motorist

Coverage is founded on the

It does not matter if the injury occurs

when the insured is on foot, bicycle, skateboard or motorcycle.

The exclusion is not a realistic method of calculating

premiums.

It is therefore a source of windfall profit to

the carrier when rightful claims go unpaid.
The

subject

exclusion

Violates

uninsured motorist coverage required by law.

the

minimum

This violation

is a result of the Bear River conditioning uninsured motorist coverage on the involved insured automobile.
The Federal District Court for Utah has previously
ruled on this issue.

In Scow v. Farmers Insurance Company,

Civil No. C80-0121, unpublished (1980), the Court reviewed
the Utah uninsured statute and case law on the topic.

The

Court held the subject exclusion violated public policy and
upheld coverage.

A copy of the Order is attached hereto.

(See Exhibit 4.)

9

B.

The Fact That Wright Was Driving His Uninsured
Motorcycle at the Time of the Crash Does Not Justify
the Exclusionary Clause.
Bear River's argument in favor of the exclusionary

clause

is

carrier.

based

in

asserted

fairness

to

the

insurance

That is, the insured did not pay a premium for the

motorcycle.
to uninsured

Therefore, the insured should not be entitled
motorist

coverage

while

on

the motorcycle.

Other state courts have coined this the "business interest"
argument.
The Court in Elledge v. Warren, 263 So.2d 912 (La.
Ct. App. 1972) , reviewed this argument carefully.

The court

found this actuarial computation argument did not apply to
uninsured motorist coverage.
rate.

Premiums are charged at a flat

That is, no difference exists

in premiums costs for

the insured's age, sex or numbers under the policy.
Uninsured motorist differs greatly from liability
insurance in this regard.

Liability premiums vary widely

depending on these "risk" factors.
The Elledge court held the flat rate factor was
strong
intended

evidence
to

that

protect

uninsured
insureds

at

motorist
all

coverage

times.

insurance carriers cannot:
create irrational and illusory
business interests and interpose them as
a bar to the comprehensive coverage
required by our statute.

10

It

was
found

The majority of courts th$t have listened to the
business interest argument have rejected it.
v.

Implement

Dealers

Ins., 640

P. 2d

908

See Jacobson
(Mont..

1982);

Elledge v. Warren, 263 So.2d 912 (La.App. 1972); State Farm
Mutual Auto Ins. Co. v. Hinkel, 488 P.2d 1151 (Nev. 1971);
Nygaard v. State Farm Mutual Auto I^is. Co., 221 N.W.2d 151
(Minn. 197 4) ; and Calvert v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Arizona,
697 P.2d 684 (Ariz. 1985).
C.

The Vast Majority of State Courts Which Have Reviewed
the Exclusionary Clause Have Struck It Down as
Violative of Public Policy.
A host of courts have now examined this issue.

Those courts striking down the exclusion include:

Calvert

v. Farmers Insurance Company, 697 P.2d 684 (Ariz. 1985) (See
Exhibit 5) ; Jacobson v. Implement Dealers Mutual Insurance
Co., 640 P.2d 908 (Mont. 1982) (See Exhibit 6 ) ; State Farm
Automobile

Insurance Co. v. Reaves,

292 So.2d

95

(Ala.

1974); Mullis v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 252
So.2d 229 (Fla. 1971); Bass v. State Farm Mutual Automobile
Ins. Co. 196 S.E.2d 485, (Ga. 1973), modified, 201 S.E.2d
444; Doxtater v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,
(1972), 8 111.App.3d 547, 290 N.E.2d 284 (111. 1972); State
Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Robertson, 295 N.E.2d 626
(Ind. App. 1973); Cannon v. American ;Underwriters Inc., 275
N.E.2d 567 (Ind. App. 1971); Elledge v. Warren, 263 So.2d
912 (La. App. 1972); Nygaard v. State Farm Mutual Automobile
Ins. Co., 221 N.W.2d 151 (Minn 1974); State Farm Mutual

11

Autombile Ins. Co, v. Hinkel, 87 Nev. 478, 488 P.2d

1151

(Nev. 1971); Bell v. State Farm Mutl. Auto. Ins. Co, , 157
207 S.E.2d 147 (W. Va. 1974).
Also, see 1984 Arizona State Law Journal 814-884,
Fall 1984.
The
Dealers Mutual

court's

thinking

for

Jacobson

Ins. Co., 640 P.2d

illustrative of those cases.
bases

in

rejecting

the

908

v.

Implement

(Mont. 1982),

is

There, the court provided two

exclusion.

"

.

.

.

(1)

the

exclusionary clause is ineffective because it reduces the
scope of coverage required by the statutory mandate; . . ."
and "(2) . . . the policy behind the statute is to protect
the

policyholders

from

uninsured

motorists

in

all

instances." at pp.910-911
POINT II
THE EXCLUSIONARY CLAUSE DOES NOT INCLUDE
MOTORCYCLES WITHIN ITS TERMS AND COVERAGE
EXISTS UNDER THE FACTS
A copy of the subject policy is attached to the
brief.

(See Exhibit 3.)
Part

coverage.

IV of

the policy

describes

the

uninsured

The definition section describes the meaning of

"insured automobile" as:
(a) an automobile described
policy for which a specific

12

in the
premium

charge
indicates
that coverage
afforded. [Emphasis added^]

is

The term "motorcycle" is not found within the
definitions.

If the intent was to exclude all owned motor

vehicles (not just automobiles) the definition would be more
inclusive.
The larger definition section within the liability
portion of the policy also leaves out the term motorcycle.
Instead, it too, uses the very limiting term of automobile
instead of motor vehicle.
The definition section is used to describe what
vehicles are covered as well as what vehicles are not.

It

appears the policy was designed to cover automobiles only.
However, the exclusion only covers automobiles as well.

The

exclusion should not be expanded to include motorcycles.
The

intent

of

the

policy

authpris

was

to

exclude

"automobiles" only.
This argument is augmented by the fact that the
"no-fault"

portion

of

the

policy

motorcycles from its coverage.
clause

should

motorcycles.

not

be

specifically

excludes

The subject exclusionary

judicially

enlarged

to

exempt

If the intent was to bar owned motorcycles

from uninsured motorist protection, the term "automobile"
should not have been used.
The policy language clearly calls for uninsured
motorist coverage under the facts.

13

Even if the policy is

held

to

be

ambiguous,

this

court

questions in favor of coverage.

has

construed

such

American Casualty Company

of Redding Penn. v. Eagle Star Insurance Co., 568 P.2d 731
(Utah 1977).

POINT III
IN THE EVENT THE EXCLUSIONARY CLAUSE IS STRUCK
DOWN,, A SET'-OFF CANNNOT BE TAKEN FOR BENEFITS
MADE UNDER THE NO-FAULT PORTION OF THE POLICY

Bear River has claimed a right to set-off from
uninsured

motorist

coverage

made

pursuant

to

the

Utah

"no-fault" laws.
This court has previously ruled on this subject.
In Thamert v. Continental Casualty Co., 621 P.2d 702 (Utah
1980), this Court held workmen's compensation benefits could
not be deducted from uninsured motorist coverage.

The court

found such a deduction would result in uninsured motorist
coverage in an amount less than the statutory minimum.
The same result would occur by deducting no-fault
benefits from uninsured motorist coverage.
The uninsured motorist statute is silent on the
right of a carrier to set-off benefits.

This court in

Thamert, Supra, found the lack of a set-off provision in
state law prevented such deduction.

The court found the

Utah statute set out the minimum benefits which could be
sold.

14

Utah is not alone in its position.

Many states

have not allowed set-off from statutory uninsured motorist
benefits.

See

Bachus v. Farmers Ifts. Group Exchange, 475

P.2d 264 (Ariz. 1972); Shearer v. Motorists Mutual Ins. Co,,
371 N.E.2d 210 (Ohio, 1978); Dhane v1 Trinity Universal Ins.
Co. , 497 S.W.2d 323 (Tx. 1973); and, Tullev v. State Farm
Mutual Auto Ins. Co., 345 F.Supp. 11^3 (D.C., W.Va. 1972).

CONCLUSION

The exclusionary

clause teduces the automobile

insurance coverage below the minimum set by Utah statute.
The exclusionary clause is Without rational basis.
The uninsured motorist premium paid by Utah residents is
paid at a flat rate. The coverage is not realistically risk
related.

The exclusionary clause by silencing lawful claims

results in the carrier keeping the proceeds it should have
paid out.
The attempted set-off for the no-fault benefits
previously paid would result in benefits being reduced below
statutory minimums.
reduction.

Utah law does not allow for such a

Prior case law should be followed by disallowing

such set-offs.
DATED this

J?0

day of /flat/

. 1987.

ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Wrigiit >

By: \i'
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Exhibit

a.

41-12-21

MOTOR VEHICLES

(b) If any insurance carrier not authorized tb transact business in this
state, which has qualified to furnish proof of financial responsibility,
defaults in any said undertakings or agreements, the commission shall not
thereafter accept as proof any certificate of s^id carrier whether theretofore filed or thereafter tendered as proof, so lbng as such default continues.
History: L 1951, ch. 71, § 20; C. 1943,
Supp., 57-13-60.

41-12-21. Motor vehicle liability policy — Definition — Provisions
— Coverage, (a) A "motor vehicle liability policy" as said term is used
in this act shall mean an owner's or an operator's policy of liability insurance, certified as provided in section 41-12-19 orj section 41-12-20 as proof
of financial responsibility, and issued, except £s otherwise provided in
section 41-12-20, by an insurance carrier duly authorized to transact business in this state, to or for the benefit of the person named therein as
insured.
(b) Such owner's policy of liability insurance:
(1) shall designate by explicit description or by appropriate reference
all motor vehicles with respect to which coverage is thereby to be granted;
and
I
(2) shall insure the person named therein and any other person, as
insured, using any such motor vehicle or motor Vehicles with the express
or implied permission of such named insured, against loss from the liability imposed by law for damages arising out of the ownership, maintenance
or use of such motor vehicle or motor vehicles within the United States
of America or the Dominion of Canada, subject to limits exclusive of interest and costs, with respect to each such motor vehicle, in the amount specified in section 41-12-1 (k) of this act
(c) Such operator's policy of liability insurance shall insure the person
named as insured therein against loss from the liability imposed upon him
by law for damages arising out of the use by h|m of any motor vehicle
not owned by him, within the same territorial limits and subject to the
same limits of liability as are set forth above with respect to an owner's
policy of liability insurance.
(d) Such motor vehicle liability policy shall state the name and address
of the named insured, the coverage afforded by the policy, the premium
charged therefor, the policy period and the limits of liability, and shall
contain an agreement or be endorsed that insurance is provided thereunder
in accordance with the coverage defined in this act as respects bodily injury
and death or property damage, or both, and is subject to all the provisions
of this act.
(e) Such motor vehicle liability policy need not insure any liability
under any workmen's compensation law as provide^ in Title 35, Utah Code
Annotated 1953 as amended, nor any liability on Recount of bodily injury
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to or death of an employee of the insured while engaged in the employment, other than domestic, of the insured, or while engaged in the operation, maintenance or repair of any such motor vehicle nor any liability for
damage to property owned by, rented to, in charge of or transported by
the insured.
(f) Every motor vehicle liability policy shall be subject to the following
provisions which need not be contained therein:
(1) the liability of the insurance carrier with respect to the insurance
required by this act shall become absolute whenever injury or damage covered by said motor vehicle liability policy occurs; said policy may not be
canceled or annulled as to such liability by any agreement between the
insurance carrier and insured after the occurrence of the injury or damage;
no statement made by the insured or on his behalf and no violation of said
policy shall defeat or void said policy;
(2) the satisfaction by the insured of a judgment for such injury or
damage shall not be a condition precedent to the right or duty of the insurance carrier to make payment on account of such injury or damages;
(3) the insurance carrier shall have the right to settle any claim covered by the policy, and if such settlement is made in good faith, the amount
thereof shall be deductible from the limits of liability specified in subdivision (2) of subsection (b) of this section;
(4) the policy, the written application therefor, if any, and any rider
or endorsement which does not conflict with the provisions of the act shall
constitute the entire contract between the parties.
(g) Any policy which grants the coverage required for a motor vehicle
liability policy may also grant any lawful coverage in excess of or in addition to the coverage specified for a motor vehicle liability policy and such
excess or additional coverage shall not be subject to the provisions of this
act. With respect to a policy which grants such excess or additional coverage the term "motor vehicle liability policy" shall apply only to that part
of the coverage which is required by this section,
(h) Any motor vehicle liability policy may provide that the insured
shall reimburse the insurance carrier for any payment the insurance carrier would not have been obligated to make under the terms of the policy
except for the provisions of this act
(i) Any motor vehicle liability policy may provide for the prorating of
the insurance thereunder with other valid and collectible insurance.
(j) The requirements of a motor vehicle liability policy may be fulfilled
by the policies of one or more insurance carriers which policies together
meet such requirements.
(k) Any binder issued pending the issuance of a motor vehicle liability
policy shall be deemed to fulfill the requirements for such a policy.
History: L. 1951, ch. 71f §21; C. 1943,
Supp., 57-13-61.

Application.
This section applies only to policies
required as proof of financial responsibility
after the owner or operator has been in an
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MOTOR VEHICLES

accident or has violated the motor vehicle
laws. Utah Farm Bureau Ins. Co. v. Chugg
(1957) 6 U 2d 399, 315 P 2d 277.
Unless the insured was within the purview
of this act when a particular policy was
issued, its provisions, unless illegal, are subject to the same construction as any other
contract. Utah Farm Bureau Ins. Co. v.
Chugg (1957) 6 U 2d 399, 315 P 2d 277.
This section applies only to cases where
one is compelled to secure a policy after an
accident in order to be able to continue to
drive; it pertains to policies obtained under
the Safety Responsibility Act and has no
application to policies written before any
accident occurs. Western Casualty & Surety
Co. v. Transamerica Ins. Co. (1971) 26 U 2d
50, 484 P 2d 1180.
Policies presented as security under
No-Fault Act.
Insurance policies used as security under
31-41-5 of the No-Fault Insurance Act must
include minimum omnibus coverage including persons operating the vehicle with the
express or implied permission of the ownerinsurer as provided in this section. Allstate
Ins. Co. v. U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co.
(1980) 619 P 2d 329.

Reasonable investigation.
Insurer lo^t right to rescind policy by failure to make reasonable investigation of
insurability (without regard to provisions of
subd. (f)(1). IState Farm Mutual Automobile
Ins. Co. v. ^ood (1971) 25 U 2d 427, 483 P 2d
892.
Collateral References.
Automobil^ liability insurance: permission
or consent tip employee's use of car within
meaning of Omnibus coverage clause, 5 ALR
2d 600.
Cancellation of compulsory automobile
insurance, 17[l ALR 550, 34 ALR 2d 1297.
Construction and application of automatic
insurance cliuse or substitution provision on
automobile liability or indemnity policy, 34
ALR 2d 936.
Recovery Under automobile property damage policy expressly including or excluding
collision damage, where vehicle strikes
embankment^ abutment, roadbed, or other
part of highway, 23 ALR 2d 389.
Scope of clause of insurance policy covering injuries sustained while alighting from
or entering ajitomobile, 19 ALR 2d 513.
Validity t>f Motor Vehicle Financial
Responsibility Act, 35 ALR 2d 1011.

41-12-21.1. Motor vehicle liability policy — Uninsured motorist
coverage required. Commencing oh July 1, 196[7, no automobile liability
insurance policy insuring against loss resulting from liability imposed by
law for bodily injury or death or property damage suffered by any person
arising out of the ownership, maintenance or us^ of a motor vehicle, shall
be delivered, issued for delivery, or renewed in tjhis state, with respect to
any motor vehicle registered or principally garaged in this state, unless
coverage is provided in such policy or a supplement to it, in limits for bodily injury or death set forth in section 41-12-5, under provisions filed with
and approved by the state insurance commission jfor IM protection of persons insured thereunder who are legally entitled to recover damages from
owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles and hit-and-run motor
vehicles beeausi^
including death,
resulting therefrom. The named insured shall ha^e the right to reject such
coverage, and unless the named insured requests!such coverage in writing,
such coverage need not be provided in a renewal policy or a supplement
to it where the named insured had rejected the coverage in connection with
a policy previously issued to him by the same insurer.
History: L. 1967, ch. 59, § 1.
Title of Act.
An act providing that no policy of automobile liability insurance may be issued or

renewed whi^h does not provide uninsured
motorist coverage. — Laws 1967, ch. 59.
Amount of coverage.
It is the indent of the legislature in adopting this section that an insured, who avails
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^ON-ASSESSABLE MUTUAL
AUTOMOBILE WSURAiNCE POUCY
Salt Lake CUy. Utah

BEAR RIVER MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY
(A Mutual Insurance Comoany, hereinafter called the company)
Agrees with the insured, named in the declarations made a part hereof. ;n consideration of the payment of the premium and in reliance upon the statement
declarations and suoiect to at! of the terms of this policy:
O A Q T I _ . LIABILITY
Coverage A—3odiiy Injury Liability-, Coverage &—Property Oamage Liability. To pay on
benaif or the insured ail sums wmch the insured shall become legally obligated to pay
as carnages oecause or.
A. aocuv injury, sicxness or disease, including death resulting therefrom, hereinafter
called "ooaiiy injury.' sustained bv any oerson:
3. injury 'o or sestrucnon of property, including loss or use thereof, hereinafter
caned '"orooefty damage',
arising cut of trie ownersnio. maintenance or use of the owned automooiie or anv nonownec automooiie. ana the comoany inai) aefena any suit aneging sucn booiiy injury or
prooerty damage ana seeking aamages wnicn are oayaoie unoer the terms ot this
poucy. even if any ot ^ allegations at the suit are groundless, false or fraudulent: out
the comoany may make sucn investigation and settlement ot any claim or suit as it
deems exoeoient.

Definitions. Linger Part I:

Suopiementary Payments. To oay, in addition to the aoolicaole limits of liability:
ia) ail exoenses incurred by the comoany. ail costs taxed against the insured in any
sucn suit and ail interest on the entire amount of any judgment therein wmch
accrues after entry of the judgment and before the comoany has paid or tendered
or deoositea m court that oart of the judgment wmch does not exceed the limit of
the comoany s liaoility thereon:
(b) oremiums on aooeal bonds required »n any such suit, premiums on bonds to release
attacnmems for an amount not in excess ot the aoplicaole limit of liaoility of this
poucy. and the cost ot bail bonds required of the insured because of accident or
trartic law violation arising out of the use of an automooiie insured hereunder, not
to exceed SlOQ per bail bond, but without any obligation to appty for or furmsn
an\ such bonds:
(c) etsenses incurred by the insured tor such immediate medical and surgical reliei to
otner< as snail ae imoerative at the time of an accident involving an automooiie
insured hereunaer and not due to war:
all reasonaoie exoenses. other than loss of earnings, incurred by the insured at
tne comoany s reouest.
Persons insured. The following are insured under Part I:
UJ *'<n resoect to the owned automooiie.
{{) the named insured and any resident of the same household.
(2) 3ny other oerson using sucn automooiie with the oermission of the named insured orovioed his actual ooeration or (if he is not coeratmgj his other actual
use therect is *nnin the scooe ot sucn permission. 3nd
(3) any otner person or organization but only with resoect to his or its liaOility
because of acts or omissions ot an insured under (a) (I) or (2) aoove:
(b) witn resoect to a non«owned automooiie.
M) the named insured.
l2) any relative but oniv with resoect to a ornate passenger automobile or trailer
provided his actual ooeration or (if he »s not ooeratmg) the other actual use
thereof is with the oermission. or reasonaoly believed to be with the permis
sion. of trie owner and is within the scooe ot sucn permission, and
(3) any otner oerson or organization not owning or hiring tne automobile, but
only witn resoect to his or us liaoility because of acts or omissions of an
insured under (b) ( l ) or (2) aoove.
n»« insurance arforoed under Part I aooiies separately to each insured against whom
cairn is made or suit is brought, but the inclusion herein of more than one insured
snail not operate to increase the limits ot the company s UaPility

(2) the corhoany insured ail private passenger, farm and utility automooi
ed by the named insured on the date or sucn acquisition ana tne n<
sured hotifies the comoany within 30 days and during the :OIICY o
sucn acquisition of his election to mane this and no other policy issue
comoany aooiicable to such automooiie. or
(d) a temoorary suostitute automooiie:
"temporary suostitute automooiie" means any automobile or trailer, not ov
the named insured, while temoorartty used with the oermission of the owner as
stitute for the qwned automobile or trailer wnenwithdrawn from normal use !
of its breakdown, repair, servicing, loss or destruction:
"non-owned automooiie" means an automooiie or trailer not owned by or fu
for the regular use of either the named insured or any relative, other than a ter
suostitute automooiie.
"private passenger automobile" means a four wneel private passenger, station
or seep type automooiie:
"farm automooiie" means an automobile of the truck tyoe with a load cao
fif\een nundred pounds or less not used for business or commercial puroose
than farming;
"utility automooiie" means an automobile, ather than a farm automooiie. wttf
capacity of fifteen hundred pounds or less ot the oicx-up body, sedan delivery c
true* type not ysed for Business or commercial ourooses;
'Trailer* means a trailer designed for use with a private oassenger automooii<
being used for business or commercial ourooses *un other than a onvate oas
farm or utility automooiie. or a farm wagon or farm implement wmie used witn
automooiie:
"automooiie business" means the business or occupation of selling, repairing,
mg. storing or parking automooiies:
"use" of an automooiie includes the loading and unloading thereof.
-war" means war. wrtether or not declared, avii war. insurrection, reoeihon c
tution. or any ait or condition modem to any of the foregoing.
Exclusions. This ooiicy does not apply under Pan I:
(a) to any automooiie while used as a ouonc or iivery conveyance, but this r.
does not apply to tr^ named insured with resoect to ooptiy injury or :
damage wmcn results from the named insured's occupancy of a noo-owni
mooue otheif than as the operator thereof:
(b) to oodiiy injury or property damage caused intentionally by or at the dire
the insured:

"named insured" means the individual named in Item I of the declarations
includes his spouse, it a resioent of the same nousenoid:
"insured" me^ns a person or organization oescnoeo unoer "Persons insurei
"relative" means a relative ot the named insured wno is a resident ot the same nc

I to bodily injury or prooerty damage with resoect to which an insured under this
policy is also sn insured under a nuclear energy liability policy issued by
Nuciear Energy Liability Insurance Association. Mutual Atomic Energy Liability
Underwriters or Nuciear Insurance Association of Canada, or would be an insured
under any such policy but for its termination upon exhaustion of its limit of

chased other automooile Iiaoility insurance aobticaole to sucn automoo
which a soecfic premium charge has h^trr made.
Financial Responsibility Laws. When this policy is certified as oroof of financial r
sioiiity for The future under the provisions of any motor vehicfe financial resoon
law. sucn insurance as is afforded by this policy for oodily injury iiaoility or fa;
Iiaoility;
erty damage itaOiiity shall comoly with the provisions of-sucn law to the extent
) to oooiiy injury or prooerty damage arising out of the operation of farm machinery: coverage ana limits of Iiaoility reouired by sucn law. but in no event in excess
I to bodily injury to any emoioyee of the insured 3nsing out of 3nd in the course of limits ot Iiaoility stated in this policy. The insured 3grees to reimourse the co
(I) domestic emoiovment oy the insured, if benefits therefor are m wnole or in
parr either payaole or recuired to be provided under 3ny worxmen s condensation for any payments made by the comoany which it would not have been ooii^a
make under the terms of this policy exceot the agreement contained .<
law. or :2) other emoiovment by the insured:
parasraon.
to bodily injury to 3nv fellow emoioyee of the insured injured in the course of His Limits of Liability. The limit of bodily injury liability stated m the dectaratic
emoiovment if such injury arises out of the use of an automooile in the ousmess appncaoie to 'eacn oerson ' is the limit of the comoany s uaoiiity for ail can
of his emoioyer. Out this exclusion does not aooly to the named insured wttn including damages for care and loss of services, arising out ot oodily injury sus
resoect to injury sustained by any sucn fellow emoioyee:
by one oerson as the result or 3ny one occurrence: the limit ot sucn naoiiitv
to 3n owned automooile wmie used by any person wmie such person is emoioyed m the declarations as aooticaole to 'eacn occurrence" is. suoject to the aoove
or otherwise engaged m the automobile business. Out this exclusion does not aooly sion resoecting each person, the total limit ot the comoanv s iiaoiiity for ait sucn
to the named insured, a resident ot the same housenold as the named insured, a ages arising out ot bodily injury sustained by two or more persons as the re«
partnership in wnich the named insured or sucn resident is a partner, or any
any one occurrence.
partner, agent or emoiovee of the nameo insured, sucn resident or oartnershio;
The limit of prooerty damage liability stated m \r\t declarations as aoclica
to a non-owned automooile *nne maintained or used by any person wmie sucn
"eacn occurrence' is the total limit of 'he comoanv s iiaoiiitv Jar ail ^amazes <
person ,s emoiovea or otherwise engaged in (I) the automooile business of the
out of or miury to or destruction of all orooerry at :ne or more persons :r or?
.nsurec or :f anv otner person or organization. (2) any other ousir>ess or occuoanofi
•ions, including the >oss of use thereof, as the result ot anv one occurrence.
of the insured, but this exclusion (hi (2) i c e s not oooiy to a orr/ate oassenger autoOther Insurance. If the insured has other insurance against a ;oss covered bv
mooile :oerateo or occupied by the named insured or oy ms ortvate cnaurfeur or
ot this ooiicy the comoany snail not be ttaaie uncer mis soiicy for a greater orcc
domestic servant or a trailer used therewith or with an owneo auromoone:
of sucn loss than the aooltcaole umit of Iiaoility stated m the declarations :e
to imury to or cestrucnon of (1) orooerty owned or transoorred by the insured or
the total aooltcaole limit or iiaoility of ail vand ana coilecticie insurance a^ams:
;2) orooerty rented to or in cnarge or the insured otner than a residence or
loss, provided, however, the T.surance *»th resoect to a temoorarv suostitute
private parage:
mooiie or non-owned aut»mcoile snail be excess insurance over any otner van
to the ownersmp. natntenance. operation, use. loading or unloading of sn automocollectible insurance.
biie ownersmo of wmcn «s acauired Oy the named insured during the ooncy period
ar 3ny temporary suosntute automooiie therefor, if the named insured has pur-

PART II -

PERSONAL INJURY PROTECTION
SECTION I

Comoanv agrees with the named insured, subject to ail of the provisions in this Policy Period: Territory
orsement and to all of the provisions of iht policy except as modified herein, as This coverage aopiies only to accidents which occur during the poiicy period and v
3ws:
the Umtea States of America, its territories or possessions, or Canaaa.
Limits of Liability
CTION I
Regardless of the number of persons insured, policies or bonds aoolicacle. claims r
.SONAL INJURY PROTECTION COVERAGE
or insured motor vehicles to wmcn this coverage aoones. the Comoanv's liaotul
Comoanv will oav personal injury protection benefits to or on benaif of eacn eligtbie personal injury protection benefits witn resoect to boaiiy injury sustained by an>
red oerson ror:
eiigioie injured oerson in any one motor venicie accident, is limited as follows:'
a) medical expenses.
i. the maximum amount oayaoie for medical exoenses snail not exceed 32.300:
b) work loss.
2. the maximum amount pavaoie forworn loss is
O funeral expenses, and
(a) eignty five percent of any loss of gross income and earning caoacity, n
0) survivor loss
exceed the total of 5150 per week:
i resoect to ooaily injury sustained bv an eligible mjureo person caused by an
(b) Not exceeding $12.00 per dav for services actually rendered or exoenses rea
dent involving the use or a motor venicle as a motor venicie.
aolv incurred for ser/ices that, but for the injury the injured person would
usions
performed for his housenold.
i coverage does not aopiy:
3. the maximum amountpayaole for funeral exoenses shail not exceed $1,000:
to ooailv injury sustained by any person while occuoymg a motor vehicle which
4. the amount pavaoie for survivor loss is S2.QGQ and is payaole only to na
is owned by the named insured and wmcn is not an insured motor venicie:
persons wno are the eligible-injured oerson s neirs:
to ooaily injur/ sustained oy the named insured or 3ny relative wmie occuoymg
5. anv amount payable by the Comoanv under the terms of this coverage sha
a motor venicie wmcn is owned bv a relative ana for wmcn the security required
reduced by the amount paid, payaole. or reouired to oe provided on accoui
by the Ut3n Automooile No-fauit Insurance Ac: ;s not in effect:
sucn boaiiy injury
to ooailv imurv sustained bv 3nv oerson wmie ooeratmg the insured motor venicie
(a) unoer any workmen's condensation plan or anv similar statutory plan, :
without the exoress or imoiiea consent ot the insured or wmie not m tawiul possesthan Utan's Wornmen's Condensation Plan
sion or the msurea motor venicie:
(b) by the United States or any of its agencies because of his or ner bein
active duty in the military services.
(c) unaer any aopiicaole deductible set forth m this endorsement or m the p
to wmcn it is attached.
Conditions
A. Action A$3inst Comoany. Mo action snail lie against the Comoanv unless as a com
precedent thereto, there snail have oeen fun comonance with ail the terms o
coverage.
8. Notice. In the event of an accident, written notice containing particulars surfi
to identify the eiigioie injured oerson. and also reasonaoly ootainaole inform
o badilv injury sustained bv 3ny person injured wnile occuoymg or. while a pedesresoecting the time, place and circumstances of the accident snail be given
nan tnrougn the use ot any motor venicie. otner than the insured motor venicie.
on oenait ot eacn eiigioie injured person to the Comoanv or any of its authc
agents as soon as oracticaole. If any eiigioie tmured oerson. his legal reoresent
or wmcn tne security required under the Utan Automooiie No-fauit Insurance Act
or nis survivors shall institute legal action to recover damages for boaiiy injury ag
s in erfect:
a oerson or organization wno is or may be liaoie in tort theretor. a'cony o
o bodily injury sustained by anv person, if such persons conduct contributed to
summons and complaint or other process served m connection with such legal a
us injury unoer either of the following circumstances:
shall be forwarded as soon as practicaole to the Comoany oy sucn eligible m
1) causing mjurv to himself intentionally, or
person, his legal reoresentative. or his survivors.
2) wmie committing a felony:
o bodily mjurv sustained by anv person arising out of the use of any motor vehicle C. Meoical Reports: Proof of Claim. As soon as oracticaole the eligible injured pi
or someone on his behalf snail give to the Company written proof of claim, i
'niie located for use as a residence or oremises:
oath if required, inclines full particulars of the nature and extent of the »nj
o-ooaily injury due to war. wnether ar not deer"***4, civil war. insurrectidn, rebellion
and treatment receiv
d contemoiated. and sucn other jinformation as mav <
r revolution, or to any act or condition mctaer
ny of the foregoing;
the Comoanv In defsi
^ ??»* zmmiat .•*•.!* -»*** «-...*»..-. n.>o bodily injury resulting from the radioactive^«iic exoiosive or other hazardous
t
irooemes of nuci»2r mar^nai

» auvi aa wnatever else is necessary to secure
•t?nts. Sucn oerson s j J L
hing after loss to oretudice sucn ngnts.
ti* bodily injury caused by an
(3) the named insured or any relative who
E. Reimbursement and 1WR**reement. In the event of any payment to any a
' accident involving the use of any motor vernc
under ttiis coverage:
(b) any other oerson wno sustains boaily injury caused by an accident while
I. the Comoany snail be entitled to the extent of such oayment to the pro
(1) occupying t^t insured motor vemcie with the consent or the insured or
of any settlement or judgment that may result from rr:e exercise or any
(2) occuoymg any other motor vemcie, other than a puoiic or livery conveyance,
of recovery ot| such person against any person or organization legally resooi
ooerated by tne named insured or a relative, or
(or tne aodily[ injury because ot wmcn sucn payment ,s made: 3nd the Con
(3) a oeoestnan 1/ the accident involves iht use or the insured motor vehicle.
shall have a len to the extent or sucn payment, notice or wmcn mav be
"funeral exoenses" means funeral, burial or cremation exoenses incurred:
to the personl or organization causing sucn oocily injury, his agent, his \t\
"insured' means the named insured, the soouse or other relative or the named insured
or a court having jurisdiction m the matter:
*no resides m rhe same nousenoid as the named insured, including those wno usually
2. sucn person snail hold in trust tor the oenefit or the Comoanv ail rignts or rec
mane their nome n me same nousenoid out temooraniv live eisewnere. or anv parson
wmcn ne snail have against sucn otner person or organization :ecause :r
using tne :escnoed motor vemcie wun tne permission, either exoresseo or :monea.
300ilv miurv: |
of the owner
3. sucn oerson pall do wnatever is prooer to secure ano snail :o notnmg
"msureo motor vemcie' means a motor vemcie with resoect to which
loss to oreiuaice sucn ngnts:
(a) the iodslv miurv itaoiutv insurance ot tne poncy aopues and for which a soecific
4. sucn oerson inail execute and deliver to the Comoany -nstruments 3no :
premium is charged, and
as may ce ao|oroonate to secure me ngnts ano sensations 01 sucn oersor
(b) the named msureo is required to maintain security under the provisions of the
the Comoanv ^staoiishec bv this provision
Utan Automooile No-Fauit Insurance Act:
F Non-Ouciication jjf Benefits: Other insurance. No eiigioie miured oerscn snail re
"medical exoenses means tne reasonaoie exoenses incurred for necessarv medical.
duoiicare oenenrjs tor the same elements of loss unoer this or *nv simnar msur
surgical, x-ray. dental and renaoilitation services, including prosthetic devices, necessarv
In the event th?t an eiigioie .mured oerson *no is a named nsureo. a r«i
amcuiance noscitai, ind nursing services, and anv nonmedical 'emeaiai cm ano
or *no ,s .niurei m an accicenr .nvoivmg the use of an nsurec -ncrcr venic:
treatment '?nc»r?o m accorcance wun a recognizee metnod 01 healing; t :oes not
otner iimuar n|surance avaiiacie ino aooncaoie 'an 'ne accident :ne ^ax
'nciuce **censes >n excess at those ;ar 3 semi-anvate room, uniess more intensive
recover/ uncer jii -ucn insurance sr.aii not exceed ? amount *nicn *ou:d
:2re s meciciiif 'eouired.
:een covaoie unoer 'ne provisions at 'ne insurance ::r;:-3ing tne ^'«n»s: cc.ar
mc::r .en-cie means 3nv vemcie or a Hind reouireo to oe registered wun tne Division
anG tne Comoan|y snail not :e laoie 'or 1 ;re2*er :rcoort:on or an-.- oss ::
or Mo::' vehicles or tns Jtan State "ax Commission unoer litte - I 119. Utan Ccae
this coverage aojones than tne t:mit or !;aou:tv -ereuncer rears t: tne cum :
Annotated .'ill :u: excluding motorcycles:
aociicaate :imits|or iiaoinry or :ms coverage
anc sucn ::ner nsurance. in -ne
'"nameo .nsureo means :ne oerson or organization named in the declarations:
tnat an eiigioie injures person, otner ?nan 3 named msureo. relative, or a :
"occuoving* means :emg in or uoon a motor teniae as a passenger or ooerator or
.vno is niured 1(1 an accident nvoivmg *ne jse :r in insured motor vemcie
engaged n -ne 'mmeciate acts or entering, soaramg or angnting from a motor vemcieotner similar nsujrance avauaoie ano aooncaoie to tne accident, tne coverage :ro
"pedestrian means anv person not occuoymg or riding uoon a motor vemcie. otner
unoer this endorsement snail oe excess over sucn otner insurance,
tnan anv oerson occusving or namg uoon a motorcvcie.
SECTION I!
relative means a soouse or any other oerson related to the named insured bv oiooo.
marriage or aoootion (including a -vara or roster cmid) wno is 3 resident or the same In consideration of }he coverage arforaed unaer Section l and the adjustment or aoi
nousenoio as tne named insured, or wno usually makes ms home in the same nousenoid ble rates:
|
but temooraruy lives eisewnere.
(a) anv amount payable unoer the Uninsured Motorists Coverage snail be rec
"survivor ;oss means comoensation on account of the death of :he eligible injured
ov
tne
amoynt
of any personal injury protection oenents paid or oavaole •
personthis or inv rather automooiie insurance poncy because nf oooily injury oust
'worn IOSS" means rai !oss of income 3nd loss of earning cooacitv ov the eli^iole »niured
by an engiblte injured person
person curing "is lifetime *rom maoiiirv to worn aunng 3 oerioa commencing tnree aavs
arter the :ste of
tne
ooci>v
miurv
ano
continuing
*or
3
maximum
oi
52
consecutive
SECTIJON !(!
«eens trere2**er orovicec tr.at if sucn eiigioie injured oerson s .naonitv to wor* snail
sc ::nt:r.ue ':r n ^xces: ar a total or two consecutive *ee*s after tne aate or tne ocotlv The oremium :or :h;e policy is oased on rates wmcn nave oeen estaoissnec n -ei
murv :rtts tnree aay elimination penoa snail not oe aooiicaoie: ano (b) a soeciai dam- uoon tne imitattorts on trie ngnt to recover ror oamages imocseo :v tne orovi
ages allowance 'or services actually renaered or exoenses reasonaoiv incurred for ser- of the 'Jtan Automooiie No-fauit insurance Act. !n the event a court or ccmo
vices that, out ror tne injury, the injured oerson would nave oerTormea for ms nousenoid lunsaiction declares, or enters a judgment tne ertec: of wmcn is to render, tne orovi
commencing not iater than tnree aavs after the date of the miury and continuing for a of sucn act invalid or unenrorceaole m wnoie or m part, the Company snail havi
maximum or 355 days thereafter, but if the oerson s inability to perrorm these services right to recompute the premium payaole for the poiicv ana the orovisions or
snaii so continue for m excess of a total of fourteen days arter the date or injury, this endorsement snail be voidable or sudiect to amenament at the option of the Comoa
tnree-cay „ m ,n a t ,on p m 0 snail not be aoccaoU.
p A R T
n | _ p H Y S I C A L
DAMAGE
Coverage 0 (1) Comprehensive (excluding Collision); (2) Personal Effects.
(1) To pay for loss caused other than by collision to [tit owned automooiie or to a
non-ownea automooile. For the puroose of this coverage. dreaKage of glass and
loss caused by missiles, falling objects, fire, theft or larceny, explosion, earthquake, rftndstorm. nail, water. Mood, malicious mischief or vandalism, not or civil
commotion or colliding with a bird or animal, shall not be deemed to be loss
caused by collision.
(2) To pav for toss caused by fire or lightning to robes, #eanng aoparei and other
personal effects wmeft are the prooerry of the named insured or a relative, wniie
sucn effects are m or uoon the owned automooiie.
Coverage £—Collision. To oay for loss caused by collision to the owned automooile
or to a non-owned automooile but only for the amount of each such loss m excess
of the aeouctioie amount stated in the declarations as aooncaoie hereto. The
deductible amount snait not aooiy to loss caused by a collision with another automooiie msureo by the comoany.
Coverage F—fire. Lightning and Transoortation. To oay for loss to the owned automooiie or a non-owned automooiie, caused (ai by fire or lightning, (b) by smoKe or
smudge due to a sudden, unusual and faulty ooeration of any fixed neating eouioment
serving tne oremises m wmcn the automooiie is located, or (c; by the stranding,
sinking, burning, collision or derailment ot any conveyance in or uoon wmcn the
automooile is oetng transoorted.
Coverage S—Theft. To oay for loss to the owned automobile or to a non-owned automooile causeo by theft or larceny.
Coverage H—Combined Additional Coverage. To pay for loss to the owned automobile
or a non-ownea automooile caused by wmastorm. hail, earthquake, explosion not or
civil commotion, or tne forced landing or tailing of any aircraft or its oarts or eouioment. flood or rising waters, malicious miscmet or vandalism, external discnarge or
leaxage of water exceot loss resulting from rain, snow or sleet wnether or not winddriven: oroviaed. wan resoect to eacn automooiie S25 snail be deducted from eacft
loss caused by malicious miscnief or vandalism.
£ T ! ! a t 3! , s^ ar ooi we m, wn tt a ? dt nUeO 0 f C a , t t - To » y <<* « * • « * and labor costs necessitated
-^•.J ,
°<
° * ° * * automooile or of any non-owned automooiie. projided the laoor .* performed at tne oiace of disablement
Sueptemtntary Payments. In addition to the aooncaoie limit of liability£ I ™ ' S t I ! * , n w « for transoortation exoenses incurred during the period
tnt,t C0VCfM bY tm$ oo,,c
nt,r
22?rS!!V* oufS
?i t 8 f t0a tflt
rWOrtWl
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terminating
wnen
he automooiie is returned to use or tne comoany gays for the loss; provided

>AU oer aay or totaling more tftan S3QQ.
V € f a ? e and
!teeaiiy
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« wtransoorted.
t « ^ wmch the insured becomes
tne automooile
oewmes
T
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25.
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o" «»• tllectiwt date of this ooticy and not descrtbed
serein, or (Z) 3 trailer ownersmo of wmcn is acmi.red dunn* the 00 ,cv " nol

"insured" means (91 with resoect to an owned automooiie. (1) the named insi
and (2) any oerson or organization (other than a oerson or organization emoi
or otherwise engaged in tne automooile business or as a carrier or other 3.
for hire) maintaining, using or navmg custody ot said automooile with the oermi«
of the named insured and within the scooe of sucn oermtssion: (b) with resoet
a non-ownea automobile, the named insured and any relative wmle using sucn
mobiie. provided his actual ooeration or (if ne is not ooeratmgj the other a<
use thereof is with the permission, or reasonaoly beiieved to be witn the
mission, of the owner and is within the scooe of sucn permission-.
"non-owned automobile" means a private passenger automooile or trailer not o>
by or furmsned for the regular use of either tne named insured or any reia
otner than a temodrary substitute automooile, *niie said automooiie or trailer
the possession or custody or the insured or is oemg ooerated by him-,
"toss" means direct and accidental loss of or damage to la) the automobile, in
ing its eduioment. or (bJ other insured prooerty-.
"collision" means collision of an automobile covered by this policy with an
£Oiect or witn a vemcie to wmcn it is attacned or oy uoset of sucn automooiii
"trailer" means a trailer designed for use with a orivate oassenger automooile, i
being used tor ousiness cr commercial purooses wun otner tnan a orivate passe
(arm or utility automooiie. and \i not a name, ottice. stare, cusotay or passenger u
Exclusions. This ocjncy does not aooly unoer Part ill:
(a) to any automobile wmle used as a puoiic or livery conveyance
lb) to loss due to war;
(d to loss to a nqn-owned automobile arising out of its use by the insured
he is emoioyed or otherwise engaged in tne automooiie ousmess:
(d) to loss to a ornate oassenger. farm or utility automooiie or trailer owned b
named insured land not described in this poncy or to anv temoorary suosi
automobile therefor, if the insured has otner valid ana collectible msui
against such loss:
(e) to damage whic|n is due and confined to wear and tear, freezing, mecnamc
electrical breakdown or failure, unless sucn damage results from a tnert CO'
by this poncy; \
(f) to tires, unless damaged by fire, malicious mischief or vandalism, or stoii
unless tne loss be coincident witn and from the same cause as other toss co
by tms ooticy;
(g) to loss due to radioactive contamination:
(h) under Coverage E. to breakage of glass if insurance with resoect to sucn bre;
is otherwise afforded.
Limit of Liability. The limit of the comoany s liability for loss- shall not v.
the actual casn value of the prooerry, or if the loss is ot a part tnereo
actual casn value of sucn part, at time of loss, nor what it would then co
reoair or reolace the prooerry or sucn part thereof with other of (ike unc
quality, nor. witn resoect to an owned automooiie described in this policy
aooncaoie limit of liability stated in the declarations: provided, however, the
of the comoany's liability (ai for loss to personal effects arising out of any one c
rence is S1QQ. and (b) tor loss to any trailer not owned by the named insured is
Other Insurance, it the insured has other insurance against a loss covered by
HI of this oolicv. !the comoany shall not be iiaOie under this policy tor a* %r

ss trie company insures ail private passenger, farm anil utility automooiies and
ers owned by the named insured on me date of sucn acquisition and the
ed insured notifies the comoany during the policy period or within 20 days
' the Cate of sucn acouisition of his election to make this and no other policy
!d by the company aooiicaoie to sucn trailer.

prooomon of sucn ioss than the aooiicaoie limit cf liaoiiity of :ms policy be
tne total aooliC30le limit of liaoihty of an vand ana collectible insurance a
such loss: provided, however, the insurance witn resoect to a temcorary suo
automooiie or non-owned automooiie snail be excess insurance over anv otnei
and collectible insurance.

PART IV-PROTECTION AGAINST UNINSURED MOTORISTS
rage J—Uninsured Motorists (Qamages for Sodily Iniury). To pay all sums *mch
nsured or ms ;egai reoresentative snail be legally entitled to recover as damages
tne owner or ooerator of ^n uninsured automooiie because cf bodily m;ury. sicxor disease. mcuding deatn resulting tnerefrom. Hereinafter called "bodily
y." sustained ay tne insured, caused by accident and arising out of the ownermaintenance or use of sucn uninsured automooiie: provided, 'or tne purooses
us coverage, determination as to wnether the insured or sucn reoresentative is
ly entitled to recover sucn damages, ana if sa tne amount tnereof. snail be
» oy agreement between tne insured or sucn reoresentative and the comoany or.
ey 'an to agree. by arbitration.
jucgment against any person or organization alleged to be legally resconsiole
he -ccuv -niury snail ce conclusive, as between me insured and tne ccmoanv.
e issues of i'aointy cf sucn person or organization cr of tne amount of aam;o *mcn tne -.nsurec :s legally entitled unless sucn judgment is entered our: *o an action prosecuted oy tne insured witn tne written consent of tne comoany.
itions. Tne definitions under Part I. exceot tne definition of "insured."' aopty
irt iV. ana under Part iVred" -neans.
e named .nsured and any relative:
iy otner oerson wmie occupying an -nsured automooiie: ano
iv oerson. witn resoect to oamages ne is entitled to recover because of bodily
to wmen this Port aooues sustained OY an insured under 'ai or to) aoove.
nsurancc afforded unoer Part IV aooues seoaratelv to eacn insured, but tne
;ion herein ct Ttore tnan one insured snail net ooerate to increase the limits cf
r

s iiaotiity.

yfe*jt^iiifwRCT&f]
a private cassanger. fafifi or utility automooiie. ownersnip ot wmch is acouired
i namec 'nsured aunng the policy period, provided
reoiaces an insured automooiie as aefined m (a) aoove. or
e comoany insures under this coverage ail private passenger, farm and utility
itomooiles owned oy the named insured on the date of sucn acouisition and the
imed insured notifies the comoany during the policy period or within 30 days
ter the cate of sucn acquisition or his election to mane the liability and Umnred Motorist Coverages unaer this and no other policy issued by the company
iQiicabie to such automooiie.
temoorary suostituce automooiie for an insured automooiie as defined m (a) or
love, and

ryint" means in or uoon or entering into or aiigntmg from,
i" includes tne District ot Coiumoia. a territory or possession of the United
and a province of Canada.
wws. This potter d«*s not awiy unutr Pan IY*. ; _ „
bcoiiv injury to an insured wfltfe occuoymg an autcmobtfrf other than an >wred
omooiie* awmto bvjine named insured-or a reta&vtv or through being ^ i c x
wen an antomooiietV
• > < * « — « « * * • - * ***-*~.
boo.lv miury to an insure* wjtH r&MSSSitfK.Wk^lmtk
his legal reoreitative or any person entitled to oayment under this coverage snail, without
tten consent or tht comoany, mane any settlement with any person or organ*
:ion wno may oe Iegaiiv iiaole therefor:
is to mure directly or indirectly to the benefit of any workmen s condensation or
aoiiity oenents earner or any person or organization auaiifymg as a seif-msurer
ler any worxmen s compensation or disaouuy oenents law or any similar law.
of Liability.
i limit of liability for umsured motorists coverage stated m the declarations iz
ole to *acn person ' is the limit ot the comoany s liaoiiity for ail damages,
ig damages for care or loss ot services, because ot booiiv injury sustained bv
rson as tne result ot any one accident and. suoiect to tne aoove provision
mg eacn person, the limit ot liability stated in the declarations as aooiicaoie
n accident' is the total limit of the comoany *s liaoiiity for ail damages, mciudnages tor care or loss of services, because of bodily injury sustained by two or
ersons as the result ot any one accident.
' amount payaoie unoer the terms ot this Part because of bodiiv injury sustained
iccident by a persdn wno is an insured under this Part snail be reduced by
sums paid on account ot such bodily injury by or on benalf ot (i) the owneror
Tatar of the uninsured automobile and (u) any other person or organization
itty or severally iiaole togetner w»tn sucn owner or operator for sucn bodily
iry including ail sums paid under Coverage A. and
amount paid and the present value ot ail amounts payable on account of such
lily injury under any workmen s compensation law. disaoiiity benefits law or
similar law.
payment made under this Part to or for any insured shall be aooiied in reducthe amount of damages wmen he may oe entitled to recover from any person
under Coverage A.
( comoany snail not be obligated to pay under this coverage that part of the
a whicn the insured may be entitled to recover from the owner or operator ot
sured automooiie wmen represents expenses tor medical services paid or payder Part II.

(d) a non-owned automobile whiie being ooerated by the named insured: and the
"insured automooiie" includes a trauer *mle being used witn an automooiie ces<
in (a), (b). (c) or (d) above, but snail not include(1) any automooiie or trailer owned by a resiaent of the same housenoid a
named insured.
(2) any automobile while used as a public or livery conveyance, or
(3) any automooiie wftile being used without the permission of the owner,
"uninsured automobile" includes a trailer of anv type and means:
(a) an automooiie or trailer with resoect to the ownersmo. maintenance cr «j
whicn there is. in at least th* amounts specified bv the financial respcnsicii^
of the state m wmen the insured automooiie is pnncioailv garaged, to coc:; JJ
liaoiiity bona Qr insurance policy aooiicaoie at tne lime of :ne acacent *«tn -?
to any ;erson or organization iegaiiv resoonsioie 'or tne use of sucn automooi
with resoect to *nicn tt)^r» is a ooaily miurv liaomty bono or insurance POUCY
caole at the rime of the 3cciaent out the comoany anting tne same semes :ov
thereunder, or
(b) a hit-and-run automobile:
but the term 'uninsured automooiie" snail not include:
(1) an insured automooiie or an automooiie iurmsned for the regular use o
named insured or a relative.
(2) an automooiie or trailer owned or ooerated by a seif-insurer within the meam
any motor venicie financial resoonsioiiity law. motor carrier law or any simiiai
(3) an automobile or trailer owned by tt\e United States of America. Canada, a i
a political suodivision of any sucn government or an agency of any of the
going.
(4) a land motor venicie or trailer if ooerated on rails or crawler-treads or
located for use as a residence or premises and not as a vemcie. or
(5) a farm type tractor or souioment designed for use principally off public r
•xceot wnne actually uoon oudlic roacs.
"hit-and-run automobile" means in automooiie wmch causes bodily injury to a
sured arising out ot pnysicai contact of sucn automooiie witn the insured or wn
automooiie wmen the insured is occupying at tne time of tht accident, provide*
there cannot oe ascertained the identity of either the ooerator or the owner of
"hit-and-run automobile"; (b) the insured or someone on his benalf snail have re
ed the accident within 24 hours to a ooiice. peace or judicial officer or to the
missioner of Motor Vehicles, and snail have filed with the company within 30
thereafter a statement under oath that the insured or his legal reoresentative r
cause or causes of action arising out of such accident for carnages against a pc
or persons wnose identity is unascertainadie. and setting forth the facts in sut
thereof; and (ci at the comoany's reouest. the insured or his legal represent;
makes avaiiaoie for inspection the automobile wnich tne insured was occupym
the time of tne accident

Other Insurance. Witn resoect to bodily injury to an insured while occupying an au
mooiie not owned by tne named insured, the insurance under Part IV snail aoply o.
as excess insurance over any other sirmfar insurance avaiiaale* to sucn insured i
appiicaote to sucn automooiie as primary insurance, and this insurance snail tp
aoply only in tne amount by wmen tne limit of liaoiiity for this coverage exceeds t
aooiicaoie limit of liaoiiity of such otner insurance.
Except as provided in the foregoing paragraon, if the insured has other simi
insurance available to him and aoolicaple to the 3cciderx. ifi€ damages snail
deemed not to exceed the nigher of the aooiicaoie limits of liaoiiity of this msu/ar
and sucn other insurance, and the comoany snail not be liable for a greater proo
tion ot any loss to wmen this coverage aoplies than tne timit of liaoiiity nereunc
bears to the sum of the aopweaale Warns ot WaoUity of this insurance ana si
otner insurance.
Arbitration. If any perscn malting claim hereunder 3nd the ccmoany do not agree t!
sucn person is legally entitled to recover carnages from the owner or ooerator of
uninsured automooiie because of bodily injury to tne insured, or do not agree as
the amount ot pavment wmen may oe owing unoer this Part. then, uoon writ:
demand of either, the matter or matters uoon wmen sucn oerson and tne comoanv
not agree shall be settled by aroitratidn m accordance witn the rules of the Amenc
Arbitration Association, and judgment uoon tne award rendered by tne arcitratcrs <T
be entered m any court having jurisdiction thereof. Sucn person and the como«
eacn agree to consider itself bound and to se bound by any award made by tne ar
trators pursuant to this Part.
Trust Agreement. In the* event of payment to any person under this Part:
(aJ the company snailbe entitled to tne extent of sucn oayment to tne proceeds of j
settlement or judgment that may result from rne exercise ot any rignts of recovery
sucn person against any person or organization legally resoonsioie for the boo
injury Oecause of wftich sucn payment is mace:
(b) sucn person snail hold in trust for the benefit of the comoany ail ngnts of recovi
wmen ne snail have against sucn otner person or organization because ot the damas
wnicn are the suoject of claim made unoer this Part:
(ci sucn person snail do wnatever is.proper to secure and shall do nothing after tc
to prejudice sucn ngnts:
(d) «f reouested in writing by the company, sucft person shall take, through any reo
sentative designated by the comoany, sucn action as may oe necessary or aooroon;
to recover sucn payment as damages from sucn other oerson or organization, su
action to be taken in the name of sucn person: in the event ot a recovery, the comoj
shall be reimbursed out of sucn recovery for expenses, costs and attorneys' fi
incurred by it in connection therewith:
(ei SUCh Oersort snail sseeut* an* rl»<iv.r in **•
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9.
Preof 3f iCIaim: Me.
?eoerts— Part IV. As soon as practicable, the m
1.
?elicy Perirt. Territory. This policy aopltes o.
J accidents, occurrences and
other oerson making claim tali give to the comoany written proof ot dair
loss during the policy period wmie the automooile ts within the United States or Ameroath if required, including full particulars of the nature ano extent of *he
ica, its territories or possessions, or Canada, or is bang transported between pons
treatment, and other details entering >nto the determination ot the amount
thereof.
The insured and every other person mailing zlstss :hai! susmit to exam-.natro:
2Premium. If the named insured disposes of, acquires owtiershia cf. or replace*.
oath by any person named by the comoany ano suoscnoe the same, as offer
a private passenger, 'arm or utility automooile or, with resoect to Part III. a trailer,
reasonaoiy be required. Proof of claim snail be maoe uoon forms furmsnec
any premium adjustment necessary snail be made u of the date of such change
comoany unless the comoany shall have failed to furmsn sucn forms within
in accordance with the manuals m use oy the comoany. The named insured shall,
after receiving] notice of claim.
uoon request, furmsn reasonaole proof of the numoer of sucn aucomooiles or trailers and a aescnotion thereof.
The injured person shail suomit to physical examinations by physicians sen
the comoany wfen and as often as the comoany may 'easonaoiy reauire and i
3.
Notice. In the event of an accident, occurrence or loss, written notice containthe event oi his incapacity ms iegoi reoresentanve. or m the event at *is c
•ng particulars sufficient to identify tne insured and aiso reasonaoiy ootamaoie inforlegal recresenrajtive or the person or persons entitled to sue therefor snaii ua
mation witn resoect to tne time, place ana circumstances thereof, and the names ana
aaaresses of the s.»|ureo and of avaiiaoie witnesses, snail ae given by or for the «nrequest from the comoany execute authorization to enaoie the camcany tc
surea to the comoanv or my of its authorized agents as soon as oracticaoie. in the
medical reports! and copies of records.
event or theft the insured snail also oromotty notify the ponce, if claim is made or
1 0 . AoprauaH-Part 111. If the insured and the camcanv fai 4o agree as
suit is arougnt against the nsured. he snail immediately forward to the comoany every
amount of loss. I either may. within 60 days after proof or 'oss is filed, aemam
demand, notice, summons or otner process received 3y nim or his reoresentative.
praisa* of the Ittss. In sucn event The insured and the comoany snail eacn
if, before the comoany manes pavment of loss unaer Port IV. tne insured or ms legal
comoetent aoprjaiser. and the aooraisers snail seiect a camoetent and disin
reoresentative snail institute any tegai action for bodily injury against any person or
umoire. The 30o|raisers snail state seoarately the actual casn value ano the an
organisation egaiiv resoonsiole for the use of 3n automooiie involved m the accident,
loss and failing! to agree shall suomit their differences to the umoire. An a
a cooy or tne summons ana ccmotamt or other orocess served >n connection *t;.h sucn
writing
of anv :jwo snail determine the amount of oss. The insured anc 'he :
'egai action snail 0e •orwarcec immediately to the comoany oy the nsured Of h»s legal
snail each aav (jus chosen aooraiser and snail :ear eouany the ether exoense
recresenrotue
aooraisai ana ur^oire.
4.
T*o ar More Automaoiies—Parts I. M and 111. When :*o :r -nore automobiles are
ihe camoanyrI snail not be heid to hove waived anv of .ts jnts :v an act
.nsurec hereunder the ter^s of 'nis pcncy snan aaoiv seoarateiv fo eacn out an autoto aooraisai.
mcoiie anc a '.nun attached thereto sr.au be neid to oe one autamoaue as 'esoects
1 1 . Payment of Loss—Parr III. The camcanv mav :av far the :oss .n m-jnevi
limns "or i.aoii.rv 'jr.cer Par: I af this aoiicv. and seaarate automoaiies unaer Part ill
reoair or reoiace the damaged or stolen prooertv-. or may. at anv time ae?cre
cf this aancv inc:ucmg anv cecuct;3ie arcvisions aooncaoie thereto.
is paid or the orooerty >s so reoiaced. at .ts exoense return 3nv stoien orooert
5.
Assistance and Coooeration ol the Insured—Parts I and III. The insured snail
named insured, or at its ootion to the address snown in 'he declarations. w»tn ;
coocerate "«w tn*» camoanv and. uoon the comoany s reouest. assist m maning settlefor any resuitanit damage thereto: or mav ta*e ail or sucn aar of the orooerr
ments, n tne conduct or suits ana m enforcing anv ngnt of contnoutron or indemnity
agreed or aooraijsed value out there snail Oe no aoanconment to the camcanv T
3gamst anv oerson or organization wno r.av oe iiaoie to the insured because of Oooiiv
panv mav settle|any claim for loss either with the insured or the owner or the a
mjurv. property carnage or toss .vun resaect to wmcn insurance »s aftoraea unaer this
Part IV. Any Amount due is oavaote (a) to the insured or lb) it the insured be
policy; and 'he insured snail attend hearings and tnais and assist in securing and
to his oarent or| guardian, or ( o if the insured be deceased to his surviving
giving evidence 3nc ootammg me attenaance of witnesses, 'he insured snail not.
otherwise id) to a person authorized by law to receive sucn oavment or to i
exceot at his own cost, voluntarily mane any payment, assume any ooligation or incur
legally emitted ito recover the damages whicn tne oavment resresents: provn
anv exoense other than for sucn immediate medical anc surgical relief to others as
comoany
may at its ootion oav anv amount due in accordance with division id!
snail be tmoerat:ve >t the time of acc:cent.
12L Ho Benefit to Bailee—Part III. The insurance arforaed oy this Pone/ <
Pan IV. After notice of claim under Part IV the comoany mav reauire the insuied
mure directly or indirectly to the oenerit at any earner or other Oauee tor .in
to taxe sucn action as -nay oe necessarv or aooroonate to preserve his right *o refor loss ro the ^utomooiie.
cover damages rrom anv person or organization alleged to oe egaiiv resoonsiole for
1 3 . Subrogation—P3rts I and 111. !n the event of anv oavment unaer -ms :o
the ooc^v .riurv: ana n anv action against the comoany. the comoanv may reauire
comoanv snail be suorogatea to ail the insured i rignts of recover/ therercr
the insured t: :om cucn oerson or organization as a oarty defendant.
any person or organization ana the insured snail execute and aenver mstrume
6 . Acttcn Against Comoany—Part I. No action shall lie against the comoanv uniess.
paoers ana do ^natever else is necessarv to secure sucn rignts. The insured
as a condition orec2dent thereto, the insured snail have fuily comolied with all the
nothing after loss to prejudice sucn rignts.
terms of this ooiicy. nor until the amount of the insured's obligation to oay shall have
h^tn finally determined either by judgment against the insured after actual trial or by
1 4 . Changes. Notice to any agent or knowledge possessed bv any agent oi
written agreement of the insured, the claimant and the comoany
other person shall not effect a waiver or a change m anv oart of this ooncv (
Any person or organization or the legal reoresentanve thereof who has secured such
the comoany from asserting any ngnt unaer the terms of this ooiicy; nor s
judgment or written agreement shall thereafter be entitled to recover under this poncy
terms of this odlicy be waived or changed, exceot by endorsement issued to
to tne extent of the insurance aftoraea by this policy No oerson or organization
parr of this policy, signed by a duly authonzea reoresentanve of the comoanv
shall have any right under this policy to |0in the comoany as a party to any action
1 5 . Assignment. Assignment of interest unaer this policy snail not bina the c
against the insured to determine the insured's liaoiiity. nor shall trie comoanv be
until its consent is enaorsed hereon: if however the insured named m item
imcieaoed by the insured or his legal reoresentanve. Bankruotcy or insolvency at the
declarations, orlnis soouse if a resident of the same nousenoid. snail die, trti
insured or oi the insured's estate snail not relieve the company of any of its obligashall cover (I) (he survivor as named insured. (2) his legal r eoresentative as
tions hereunder
insured but omf whiie acting within the scooe ot his outies as sucn. (2) any
Parts II. Ill and IV. No action snail lie against the comoanv uniess. as a condition
having prooer tiemporary custody oi an owned automooiie. as an insured, u
precedent thereto, there snail have been full compliance with ait the terms ot this
aooomtment and ouanfication of such legal representative, ana (i) unaer di
poncy nor unaer Part Ml. until thirty days after proof of loss is filed and the amount
of Parr II any person wno was a relative at the ttme of sucn deatn
or loss is determined as orovided in this ooiicy.
I d . Cancelation. This policy may be cancelea by the insured named in item
7 . Medical Reoorts: Proof and Payment of Claim—Part II. As soon as practicable
declarations oy Surrender thereof to it\i comoany or any of its authorized as
the injured oerson or someone on his benalf shall give to the comoany written proor
by mailing to th^ comoany written notice stating when thereafter the canceiati"
ot claim unaer oath if reauired. and shall, after each reauest from the company
be effective. This ooiicy may be canceled bv the comoany by mailing to tne
execute authorization to enaoie the comoany to obtain medical reoorts and cooies of
named in item || of the declarations at the aaaress snown m this ooiicy wnrtei
records. The injured oerson shall submit to pnysical examination bv physicians selected
stating wnen no< less than ten days thereafter sucn cancelation snail be effeetr
by the comoany wnen ano as often as the company may reasonaoiy require.
mailing of notice as aforesaid shall be surficient proof of notice. The time of
The comoany may pay the injured oerson or any person or organization rendering
render or the effective date and hour of cancelation stated m the notice shall
the services and sucn payment snail reduce the amount payable nereunder for sucn
the ena of the policy period. Delivery of such written nonce either by sucn
injury Payment hereunder snail not constitute an admission of liability ot any person
or by the comoa|ny snail be eauivalent to mailing.
or. exceot hereunder, of the comoanv
\\ sucn insured conuets. earned OTermum snart be comouted in accordance >
S . Insured's Quues \n Eiem ot loss—Part \\\. \n tne event ot loss the insured shallcustomary snort; rate toole and procedure, it the comoany conceis. earned a
(a) protect the automooile. wnetner or not the loss is covered bv this poncy. and any
shail be comout^d oro rata. Premium aoiustmenr may oe made either at the ti
further loss due to it\B insured's failure to protect snail not be recoveraole under
ceianon is effected or as soon as oracticaoie after cancelation becomes effect
this policy; reasonaole exoenses incurred m arfording sucn protection shall be
pavment or tender of unearned premium is not j conaition of cancelation.
deemed incurred it the comoany s request:
1 7 - Declarations. 3y acceptance of this policy, the insured named in item ]
(b) promotly notify the oolice if your car is stolent
declarations agrees that tne statements m tne declarations are ms a*reeme
t o oermtt us to inspect ana aooraise the oamagea property before its ieoair or disposal:
representations,
that this policy is issued m reliance uoon the truth of sue:
(d) tile with the comoanv. *itnm 91 davs after loss, his sworn oroor or loss m sucn
semations and that this poncy emoodies all agreements existing aetween mmt
form ana including such information as tne comoany mav reasonaoiy reauire ana
the comoany or any ot its agents relating to this insurance.
shall, uoon the comoany s request, exmbit the damaged property ana suomit to
examination under oatn.
la Witness Whereof, the comqany has caused this policy to be signed by its president and secretary, Hut this policy shall not be valid unless comoieted by the atta
hereto or a declarations page designated as Part Two and countersigned on the aforesaid declarations page by a duly authorized reoresentative of the company.
The insured is hereby notified that by virtue of this policy he is a member of the Bear River Mutual Insurance Comoanv and that the annual meeting of the comoani
at the home orfice m iait Lake Giy. Utan, on tt\t first Saturoay in Marcn of eacn year, at 11:00 a.m. for the ouroose of transacting the general business ot the camoanv
tne election or airectors. As a policyholder you are entitled to vote m person at the meeting or by proxy. This notice snail be deemed full nonce of the annual me«
Rev. 1

Secretary

Exhibit.

4-

AUG Zl S i ' - 1 " W

mn
*o'G

\) -

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT 6r'UTAH
CENTRAL DIVISION
CLARENCE H. SCOW,
Plaintiff,
ORDER

-vs-

Civil No:

FARMERS INSURANCE COMPANY,
a California corooration,
d/b/a FARMERS INSURANCE

C-80-01211

GROUP,

Defendant.

Plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment and
defendant's motion for summary judgment were orally arguied
on August 13, 1980.
Fillerup.

Plaintiff was represented by Robert^ c.

Defendant was represented by Don J. Hanson.

Following the hearing, the court took the matter under advisement and has since reviewed the memoranda of counsel and various
of the authorities cited.

Based on 'the foregoing, the court

renders the following decision.
The facts of this case are not in dispute.

Onj March

1, 1976, plaintiff purchased an automobile insurance policy
from defendant for a 1970 Ford truck.
the policy was December 24, 1976.

The expiration daite of

On March 22, 1976, plaintiff

purchased another automobile insurance policy from defendant
for a 1972 Chevrolet automobile.

The expiration date oi this

second policy was June 30, 1976.

Both policies provided

personal injury protection (no-fault coverage) and uninsured
motorist coverage.
On April 20, 1976, an automobile driven by Wade J.
Sellers collided with plaintiff who was riding a motorcycle.
Plaintiff owned this motorcycle but had not purchased a separate
insurance policy for it.
Plaintiff brought a suit for personal injuries against
tfade Sellers in June, 1976.

During the course of that dase it

was discovered that Sellers was uninsured.

After this discovery,

plaintiff contacted Farmers Insurance Company and requested
uninsured motorist coverage under his two automobile insurance
policies.

In addition, plaintiff requested that defendant

enter the lawsuit against Sellers to protect its interest.
For reasons not material to this decision, defendant denied
plaintiff's requests.
Subsequently, plaintiff again made demand upon
defendant to provide coverage, including personal injury
protection (PIP) payments.

Defendant again denied coverage.

Following this second denial, a stipulated judgment was
entered against Wade J. Sellers in the amount of $30,000.00.
A finding of fact was also made that Sellers was an uninsured
motorist.

Thereafter, plaintiff filed

the present

action

seeking, among other things, PIP payments and uninsured
motorist benefits.

ff if the axclus^mvtrt

to bodily injury to an insured while
occupying an automobile or 2 wheel motor
vehicle (other than an insured motor
vehicle) owned by a named insured or any
relative resident in the sa~e household,
• or through being struck by such vehicles.
Plaintiff has cited numerous cases for the majority position that
this exclusion is void as against public policy.

See, for example,

Federated American Insurance Co. v. Haynes, 88 Wash. 2d 439, 563
P.2d 815 (1977);

Chavez v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance

Co., 87 N.M. 327, 533 P.2d 100 (1975);

State Farm Mutual

Automobile Insurance Co. v. Hinkel, 488 P.2d 1151 (Nev. 1971).

-2-

that the exclusion is void as against public policy, it:'."|6iflftj
in conflict with the Motor Vehicle Safety^ Responsibility: Apt/
Utah Code Ann. S 41-12-1 et sea.,

and particularly 41-12^21*&

which, as material to this case/ provides^
. . . [N]o automobile liability insurance
policy insuring against loss resulting
from liability imposed by law for bodily
injury or death or property damage suffered
by any person arising out of the ownership,
maintenance or use of a motor vehicle, shall
be delivered, issued for delivery, or renewed
in this state, . . . unless coverage is
provided in such policy or a supplement to
it, in limits for bodily injury or death
set forth in Section 41-12-5 . . . for the
protection of persons insured thereunder
who are legally entitled to recover damages
from owners or operators of uninsured motor
vehicle and hit-and-run motor vehicles
because of bodily injury, sickness or
disease, including death, resulting therefrom.
Plaintiff also argues that he is entitled to the maximum
uninsured motorist benefits under each of the separate policies
issued by defendant.

Defendant argues to the contrary ajid

principally relies upon Condition 8, contained in each pblicy,
which provides:
With respect to any occurrence, accident or
loss to which this and any other insurance
policy or policies issued to the insured by th^
Company also apply, no payment shall be made
hereunder which, when added to any amount
paid or payable under such other insurance
policy or policies, would result in a total
payment to the insured or other person in
excess of the highest applicable limits of
liability under any one such policy.
Plaintiff acknowledges that the wording of this conditioh operates
to limit his recovery but contends that it violates the Uninsured
motorist statute.

While an emerging majority view agrea^ with

plaintiff's position and allows stacking of insurance policies,
this court is bound to follow Utah law in this case and
therefore holds that stacking is impermissible.

Martin y.

Christensen. 22 Utah 2d 415, 454 P.2d 294 (1969).
The third issue to be resolved is whether plaintiff
is entitled to no-fault benefits from the defendant.

-3-

Section

31-41-6 of the Utah Automobile No-Fault Insurance Act provides:
(1) Every insurance policy or other
security complying with the requirements
of subsection (1)*of Section 31-41-5 shall
provide personal injury protection providing
for payments to the insured and to all other
persons suffering personal injury arising
out of an accident involving any motor vehicle
. . . (emphasis added)
'
Under § 31-41-10(a) (i), an insurer may exclude benefits for
"injury sustained by the injured while occupying another motor
vehicle owned by the insured and not insured under the policy
. . . "

"Motor vehicle" is defined in § 31-41-3 as "any

vehicle cf a kind to be registered under Title 41, but excluding,
however motorcycles."
This review of the Act reveals that motorcycles have
been excluded from the definition of motor vehicle.

As a result,

the exclusion provided in § 31-41-10 does not apply to plaintiff
because he was not occupying "another motor vehicle" owned by
him at the time of the accident.

However, the accident in which

plaintiff was injured, was one involving "any motor vehicle" as
required by Utah Code Ann. § 31-41-6 (i.e. the automobile driven
by Sellers).

A similar analysis of the PIP endorsement of the

policy issued by defendant reaches the same result.

The court

therefore holds that the exclusions set forth at Utah Code Ann.
§ 31-41-10(a)(i) and in the PIP endorsement are not applicable
and that plaintiff is entitled to coverage for no-fault benefits.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that plaintiff is entitled to uninsured
motorist benefits under the policies issued by defendant up to
$15,000.00.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff is entitled to
coverage for no-fault benefits under the policies issued by
defendant.
All other issues not disposed of by this order are

-4-

reserved for trial.
Dated this

day of August, 1980.

\\dmdL<r$&^)

David K. Winder
~
7"
United States District Court

Mailed a copy of the forecoing Order to the following
named counsel this J!/ ~~

day of August, 198 0.

Robert C. Fillerup, Esc.
1325 South 800 East
Suite 305
Orem, Utah 84057
Don J. Hanson, Esq.
520 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

^dL>

Secretary

<»T7s37: A TRUE COPY
M M i C ^ i L 3 A 3 f , l : n , CLERK
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be transferred from the county where filed
to Maricopa County. A.R.S. § 12-824 (renumbered as A.R.S. § 12-822 by Laws
1984, Ch. 285, § 7); State v. Superior Court
in and for the County of Pima, 120 Ariz.
273, 585 P,2d 882 (1978). The argument is
advanced that a plaintiff need not wait for
a demand by the Attorney General but
should be able, in the first instance, to file
the action against the state in Maricopa
County. If the action against the state
was properly brought in Maricopa County,
pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-401(7) it was proper for the action to be maintained against
the other defendants in Maricopa County.
The defendants contend that the state
was never a proper party to this action
because the state was immune from liability pursuant to A.R.S. § 26-314. Since the
state was never a proper party the residence of the other defendants was the only
proper consideration. See Turner v. Superior Court, 3 Ariz.App. 414, 415 P.2d 129
(1966).
The arguments raised by the parties
need not be resolved in this action. The
relevant consideration for the trial judge
was whether there was good cause to set
aside the dismissal and allow the plaintiff
GRL additional time to pay the required
fee. See Lemons, 141 Ariz, at 505-06, 687
P.2d at 1260-61. The record shows that
there was not a specific finding that the
action was filed in the wrong county. The
Maricopa County trial judge referred to
A.R.S. § 12-407 in his order granting a
change of venue, but that section is not
limited to changes of venue for filing in the
wrong county. We are not certain what
the trial judge had in mind in granting the
change of venue. Under the state of the
record we believe that there was sufficient
confusion to justify the superior court
judge's decision to allow the plaintiff additional time to file the required fee.
While we may question the judgment of
counsel in allowing this case to be placed in
jeopardy over the payment of a twenty
dollar fee, we find no abuse of discretion in
the actions of the trial judge.

The opinion of the Court of Appeals is
vacated, and the relief sought by petitioners in their special action is denied.
GORDON, V.C.J., and HAYS, JAMES
DUKE CAMERON and FELDMAN, JJ.,
concur.

144 Ariz. 291

Jack CALVERT, Plaintiff/Appellant,
v.
FARMERS INSURANCE COMPANY
OF ARIZONA, Defendant/Appellee.
No. 17675-PR.
Supreme Court of Arizona,
In Banc.
March 13, 1985.

Insured brought declaratory judgment
action against insurer arising out of his
son's death in accident caused by negligence of an uninsured motorist, and following insurer's refusal to pay claim for uninsured motorist benefits under vehicle liability policy. The Superior Court, Pima County, Michael J. Brown, J., granted insurer's
motion for summary judgment, and the
Court of Appeals, 697 P.2d 707, reversed.
On petition for review, the Supreme Court,
Gordon, V.C.J., held that exclusion denying
coverage to an insured injured by an uninsured motorist while insured is occupying
vehicle owned by insured but not listed in
policy is invalid as contrary to coverage
mandated by statute which controls uninsured motorist protection.
Opinion of Court of Appeals vacated;
case reversed and remanded.
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1. Statutes G=181(l)
Cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is to determine and give effect to legislative intent behind the statute.
2. Statutes <3=>181(2), 184
In determining legislature's intent in
enacting statute, Supreme Court will look
to policy behind statute and evil which it
was designed to remedy, as well as to the
words, context, subject matter, and effects
and consequences of the statute.
3. Insurance <3=467.51(1)
Uninsured motorist statute is remedial
and therefore should be liberally construed
in order to carry out intent of legislature.
A.R.S. § 20-259.01.
4. Insurance <s»467.51(3)
Exclusion denying coverage to an insured injured by an uninsured motorist
while insured is occupying vehicle owned
by insured but not listed in policy is invalid
as contrary to coverage mandated by statute which controls uninsured motorist protection; overruling Owens v. Allied Mutual Insurance Company, 15 Ariz.App. 181,
487 P.2d 402, Chambers v. Owens, 22 Ariz.
App. 175, 525 P.2d 306, and Rodriguez v.
Maryland Indemnity Insurance Company, 24 Ariz.App. 392, 539 P.2d 196. A.R.S.
§ 20-259.01.
Miller & Pitt by John L. Tully, Tucson,
for plaintiff/appellant.
Chandler, Tullar, Udall & Redhair by
D.B. Udall, Tucson, for defendant/appellee.
GORDON, Vice Chief Justice:
Farmers Insurance Company of Arizona
(defendant) petitioned this Court for review
of the decision of the Court of Appeals,
Calvert v. Farmers Insurance Company
of Arizona, — Ariz. — , (>97 P.2d 707
(1984) which struck down an "other vehicle" exclusion clause as violative of the
public policy' underlying Arizona's Uninsured Motorists Act (hereafter referred to
*• The policy defines "family member" as a person related to [the named insured] by blood,
marriage or adoption who is a resident of

as the "Act" or "Statute"), A.R.S. § 20259.01. We granted review in this case to
settle a conflict in the Court of Appeals
decisions concerning the validity of "other
vehicle" exclusion clauses in uninsured motorist coverage. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Ariz. Const, art. 6, § 5(3) and
Ariz.R.Civ.App.P. 23.
The facts in this case are not in dispute.
On January 3, 1983, Michael Calvert, age
18, while operating a motorcycle was
struck and fatally injured by an uninsured
motor vehicle. The collision was caused by
the negligence of the uninsured motorist.
At the time of the accident, Jack Calvert,
Michael's father and plaintiff in this case,
was the named insured under a motor vehicle liability insurance policy issued by
Farmers Insurance Company of Arizona
(hereafter referred to as "Farmers").
Subsequent to his son's death, Jack Calvert made a claim upon Farmers for uninsured motorist benefits. Calvert's insurance policy contained $30,000 in uninsured
motorist coverage. Part II of the policy
states the coverage for uninsured motorist:
"We will pay damages for bodily injury which an insured person is legally
entitled to recover from the owner or
operator of an uninsured motor vehicle.
The bodily injury must be caused by
accident and arise out of the ownership,
maintenance or use of the uninsured
motor vehicle." (emphasis in original)
Michael Calvert was a resident of his
father's household at the time of the accident and consequently an "insured person"
under the terms of the Farmers' uninsured
motorist coverage:
"As used in this Part:
"1. Insured person means:
"a. You or a family member.1
"b. Any other person while occupying your insured car.
* * * " (emphasis in original)
Farmers conceded that Michael was an
insured under the policy but denied Jack
[named insured] household, including a ward or
foster child.
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Calvert's claim for uninsured motorist ben- Protection Presently Available and Comefits on the basis of an "other vehicle" parative Problems in Substantial Simiexclusion clause contained in the uninsured lanty, 9 Buffalo LRev. ^83-320 (1960);
motorist section of the policy, which reads: Murphy & Netherton, Public Responsibili"This coverage does not apply to bodily ty and Uninsured Motorist, 47 Georgeinjury sustained by a person:
town L.J. 700 (1959); Collins, Implementa"1. While occupying a motor vehicle tion of Public Policy Against the Finanowned by you or a family member for cially Irresponsible Motorist, 19 Brooklyn
which insurance is not afforded under L.Rev. 11 (1952); see alsol A. Widiss, A
this policy or through being struck by Guide to Uninsured Motqrist Coverage
that motor vehicle." (emphasis in origi- (1969). Consequently, our Uninsured Monal)
torist statute mandates th4t coverage be
Farmers took the position that the exclu- provided to insure againstj bodily injury
sion applied because Michael Calvert sus- caused by uninsured motorists:
tained his fatal injuries while driving a
"§ 20-259.01. Motor vehicle liability
motorcycle that was owned by either Mipolicy; uninsurance required; underinchael or his father but that was not insured
surance optional; definitions; subrogaunder the policy.
tion
A short time later, Jack Calvert brought
"A. No automobile liability or motor
a Declaratory Judgment action against
vehicle liability policy injuring against
Farmers seeking a declaration that the
loss resulting from liability imposed by
"other vehicle" exclusion clause contained
law for bodily injury or ideath suffered
in the uninsured motorist coverage was
by any person arising oui of the ownerinvalid and unenforceable. The parties
ship, maintenance or use qf a motor vehifiled cross motions for summary judgment.
cle shall be delivered or iisued for delivConcluding that the policy did not provide
ery in this state, with respect to any
uninsured motorist coverage for the accimotor vehicle registered or principally
dent in this case, the trial court granted
garaged in this state, unless coverage is
Farmers' motion for summary judgment
provided in the policy or Supplemental to
and denied plaintiffs. The Court of Apthe policy, in limits for iiodily injury or
peals reversed, holding that the "other vedeath prescribed in subs^ctiozi B of this
hicle" exclusion clause in the Farmers' insection, but not less than! the limits presurance policy violated the public policy
scribed in § 28-1102, ur^der provisions
underlying Arizona's Uninsured Motorist
filed with and approved $y the director,
Statute, A.R.S. § 20-259.01.
for the protection of persons insured who
are legally entitled to rdcover damages
YT£agS£ Wittr the Court of Appeals thpt
from owners or operatorfs of uninsured
the^Farmers' "other vehicle" exclusionary
motor vehicles because of bodily injury,
provision contravenes the policy underlying
owlulfiiu^
We vacate
sickness or disease, including death, resulting
therefrom. For the purposes of
the Court of Appeals' opinion, however, to
the
coverage
provided for pursuant to
fully explain our reasoning.
this section, 'uninsured motor vehicles',
The problems caused by the financially
subject to the terms anji conditions of
irresponsible and uninsured motorist date
such coverage, includes iny insured moback to the advent of the mass produced
tor vehicle if the liability insurer of the
automobile and ultimately prompted our
vehicle is unable to make payment on the
Legislature to enact the'Uninsured Motorliability of its insured, within the limits
ist Act, A.R.S. § 20-259.01. See Austin &
of the coverage, because of insolvency."
Risjord, The Problem of the Financially
Irresponsible Motorist, 24 U.Kansas City Since § 20-259.01 controlsj the i i n i & u ^
L.Rev. 82 (1955); Ward, The Uninsured motorist protection mandated ii*Amon%to
Motorist' National and International resolve this case we must interpret this
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statute and determine whetHer ft autEorizes an "other vehicle" exclusion. This^is
ajnnrtter of statutory construction
[1,2] The cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is to determine and give effect
to the legislative intent behind the statute.
Phoenix Title & Trust Co. v. Burns, 96
Ariz. 332, 395 P.2d 532 (1964); Payne v.
Knox, 94 Ariz. 380, 385 P.2d 514 (1963). In
determining the Legislature's intent in enacting a statute, this Court will look to the
policy behind the statute and the evil which
it was designed to remedy. Cohen v.
State, 121 Ariz. 6, 588 P.2d 299 (1978);
City of Mesa v. Salt River Project Agr.
Imp. & Power District, 92 Ariz. 91, 373
P.2d 722 (1962). Additionally, we will look
to the words, context, subject matter, and
effects and consequences of the statute.
State ex rel. Flournoy v. Mangum, 113
Ariz. 151, 548 P.2d 1148 (1976).
[3] Our uninsured motorist statute establishes a public policy that every insured
is entitled to recover damages he or she
would have been able to recover if the
uninsured had maintained a policy of liability insurance in a solvent company. Transportation Ins. Co. v. Wade, 106 Ariz. 269,
475 P.2d 253 (1970); Dairyland Ins. Co. v.
Lopez, 22 Ariz.App. 309, 526 P.2d 1264
, (1974). The statute is remedial, and shouhi
be liberally construed in order to carry^out
the intent of theLegislatujj. Williams v.
Williams, 23 Ariz.App. 191, 531 P.2d 924
(1975); Reserve Ins. Co. v. Staats, 9 Ariz.
App. 410, 453 P.2d 239 (1969). TbW pwcpm
of the statute is to afford protectiotPto
victims of financially irresponsible drivers^
Evenchik v. State Farm Ins. Co., 139 Ariz.
453, 679 P.2d 99 (App.1984); see Geyer v.
Reserve Ins. Co., 8 Ariz.App. 464, 447 P.2d
556 (1968).
[4] We believe that IBfe exclusion pro^s?
sion in this case contravenes the pubij£
Policy underlying the Uninsured Motor^t
Act The Act-mandates that every pfolicy
issued have at least the minimum limits &r
uninsured motorist protection. In Arizdffc,
such coverage is not voluntary as in otter
jurisdictions. Furthermore, the statujp*
does not contain numerous exceptions v»

coverage as in the uninsured motorist statltfes of other jurisdictions.
The only exception to the mandatory requirement of uninsured motorist protection
under the Act is contained in A.R.S. § 20259.01(D), which expressly excludes vehicles "used as public or livery conveyances
or rented to others or which are used in the
business primarily to transport property or
equipment" If the Legislature had intended to include additional exclusions, such as
an "other vehicle" exclusion, it would have
expressly done so. Cf McClellan v. Sentry Indemnity Co., 140 Ariz. 558, 683 P.2d
757 (App.1984) (government owned vehicle
exclusion).
CSigepKi^
strong public policy mandating coverage for innocent
victims from tragic negligent acts of' uffinsureds, we will not construe the uninsured
mj2$tj|3jftj^^
when it
is silent on "other vehicle" exclusions.
TJua conclusion is in accord with the vast
majority of jurisdictions that Save deitt
wit&Itliis issue? About twenty-six states
have held that an "other vehicle" exclusion
clause similar to the one herein violates the
public policy underlying their respective
uninsured motorist statutes. See Richards
v. State Farm Mut Auto. Ins. Co., 122
Wis.2d 172, 361 N.W.2d 680 (1985); Lindahl v. Howe, 345 N.W.2d 548 (Iowa 1984);
Harvey v. Travelers Indem. Co., 188 Conn.
245, 449 A.2d 157 (1982); Jacobson v. Implement Dealer Mut. Ins. Co., 640 P.2d
908 (Mont.1982); Bradley v. Mid-Century
Ins. Co., 409 Mich. 1, 294 N.W.2d 141
(1980); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v.
Williams, 481 Pa. 130, 392 A.2d 281 (1978);
Kau v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 58
Hawaii 49, 564 P.2d 443 (1977); Beek v.
Ohio Casualty Ins. Co., 73 N.J. 185, 373
A.2d 654 (1977), affirming the lower court
decision reported at 135 NJ.Super. 1, 342
A.2d 547 (App.Div.1975); Cothren v. Emcasco Ins. Co., 555 P.2d 1037 (Okla.1976);
Chavez v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
87 N.M. 327, 533 P.2d 100 (1975); Nygaard
v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 301
Minn. 10, 221 N.W.2d 151 (1974);
Bell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
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157 W.Va. 623, 207 S.E.2d 147 (1974);
State Farm Auto. Ins. Co. v. Reaves, 292
Ala. 218, 292 So.2d 95 (1974); Hogan v.
Home Ins. Co., 260 S.C. 157, 194 S.E.2d 890
(1973); Lowery v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co., 285 So.2d 767 (Miss.1973); Touchette v. Northwestern Mut. Iris. Co., 80
Wash.2d 327, 494 P.2d 479 (1972); State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Hinkel, 87
Nev. 478, 488 P.2d 1151 (1971); Muilis v.
State Farm Mut. Auto, Ins. Co., 252 So.2d
229 (Fla.1971); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Meeks,
207 Va. 897, 153 S.E.2d 222 (1967); Barnett v. Crosby, 5 Kan.App.2d 98, 612 P.2d
1250(1980); Pennsylvania Nat'lMut. Casualty Ins. Co. v. Gartelman, 288 Md. 151,
416 A.2d 734 (App.1980); Otto v. Farmers
Ins. Co., 558 S.W.2d 713 (Mo.App.1977);
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Robertson. 156 Ind.App. 149, 295 N.E.2d 626
(1973); Bass v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co., 128 Ga.App. 285, 196 S.E.2d 485,
affd. 231 Ga. 269, 201 S.E.2d 444 (1973);
Elledge v. Warren, 263 So.2d 912 (La.App.
1972); Doxtater v. State Farm MuL Auto.
Ins. Co., 8 Ill.App.3d 547, 290 N.E.2d 284
(1972); Aetna Ins. Co. v. Hurst, 2 Cal.
App.3d 1067, 83 Cal.Rptr. 156 (1969) (The
California legislature has since amended
the California statute to permit this type of
exclusion, see Cal.Ins.Code § 11580.2 (West
Supp.1984)); Stephens v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 1363 (5th Cir.
1975); see also A. Widiss, A Guide to Uninsured Motorist Coverage, § 2.9 (1969 &
Supp.1981); Annot, 30 A.L.R.4th 172
(1984). We have carefully read these
cases, and although the uninsured motorist
statutes of the other states are not identical to the Arizona statute, we can find no
important distinction among them. We
find these cases highly persuasive.
Farmers relies on a Court of Appeals
decision, Owens v. Allied Mutual Insurance Company, 15 Ariz.App. 181, 487 P.2d
402 (1971), which found an "other vehicle"
exclusion clause to be reasonable. We find
the reasoning supporting this decision unpersuasive.2
2. Additionally, Farmers relies on Chambers v.
Owens, 22 Ariz.App. 175, 525 P.2d 306 (1974)
and Rodriguez v. Maryland Indent. Ins. Co., 24
Arizj^pp. 392, 539 P.2d 196 (1975) which are the

First, the three cases relied upon by the
court in Owens have subsequently been
effectively overruled: Rushing v. Allstate
Ins. Co., 216 So.2d 875 (La.App.1968) overruled by Elledge v. Warren, supra; National Union Indem. Co. v. Hodges, 238
So.2d 673 (Fla.App.1970) overruled by Muilis v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
supra; McElyea v. Safeway Ins. Co., 131
IU.App.2d 452, 266 N.E.2d 146 (1970) overruled by Doxtator v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., supra. These jurisdictions
are now aligned with the majority, which
consider "other vehicle" exclusion clauses
invalid.
Second, the Court of Appeals found
"nothing in the statute which prevents an
insurer from withholding protection from
an insured while he is driving an uninsured
vehicle owned by him." We believe, however, that the statute's silejice on "other
vehicle" exclusions militates against the validity of such an exclusion.
The purpose of our statute J is to close the
gap in protection under the Safety Responsibility Act, A.R.S. § 28-1101 et seq., by
requiring insurance companies issuing
automobile liability policies tio provide the
insured with financial protection against
uninsured motorists for bodily injury suffered due to the negligence of such individuals. Chase v. State Farm Mut Auto.
Ins. Co., 131 Ariz. 461, 641 P,2d 1305 (App.
1982); Balestrieri v. Hartfofd Ace. & Indem. Ins. Co., 22 Ariz.App. £55, 526 P.2d
779 (1974). The statute does not contemplate a piecemeal whittling away at the
liability protection for injuries caused by
uninsured motorists. See Touchette v.
Northwestern Mut. Ins. Co., supra; Muilis- v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
supra; State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v.
Hinkel, supra; Allstate Ins. Cb. v. Meeks,
supra. As noted above, an express provision in § 20-259.01 authorizing "other vehicle" exclusions in uninsured motorist coverage could easily have been incorporated
progeny of Owens and based on the same reasoning. Our disposal of Owens disposes of
these two cases»aiso.
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into the statute by the Legislature. Thus,
we will leave the matter to the Legislature
to expressly authorize an "other owned"
vehicle exclusion in the statute. Cf. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Hinkel, supra; Aetna his. Co. v. Hurst, supra.3
Third, the Court of Appeals concluded
that, without the exclusion, an insured
would be able to purchase one liability policy on one owned vehicle and claim uninsured motorist protection for himself and
others while driving any number of other
uninsured automobiles also owned by him.
Initially we note that the same argument
. has been made in other cases and rejected.
See Nygaard v. State Farm Mut Auto.
Ins. Co., supra; Elledge v. Warren, supra; State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v.
Hinkel, supra. See also A. Widiss, A
Guide to Uninsured Motorist Coverage
§ 2.9 (1969). The court in Hinkel, in construing Nevada's uninsured motorist statute, answered this argument, stating:
"If our Legislature had intended to
prevent an owner of two motor vehicles
from paying for insurance on only one
and recovering benefits for his injuries
sustained while operating the other, it
could have followed the lead of the legislatures in some of the other jurisdictions
and limited the coverage by providing
that N.R.S. 693.115(1) did not apply to
bodily injury suffered by the insured
while occupying a motor vehicle owned
by him, unless the occupied vehicle was
an insured motor vehicle. Such an
amendment would be the prerogative and
responsibility of the legislature and not
,. the function of this court."
87 Nev. at 483, 488 P.2d at 1154.
Furthermore, our^tlhmsnred- Motoris^
Act was created "for the protection of per*
sons*" M& ni&iSr the protection of Jiie
insured vehicle. AR.S. § 20-259.01. See
Harvey v. Travelers Indem. Co., supra;
Bradley v. Mid-Century Ins. Co., supra;

Otto v. Farmers Ins. Co., supra. This
Court recognized this fact in Wade, stating:
"The Legislature intended the Financial Responsibility Act to protect the general public against the individual, financially irresponsible motorist. On the other hand the Uninsured Motorist law compels the carriers to provide economic protection for the insured individual
against the financially irresponsible segment of the driving public. The former
is for the public in general and the latter
for the individuals who have the foresight to protect themselves against the
public." (emphasis added)
106 Ariz, at 273; 475 P.2d at 257. There is
nothing in our uninsured motorist statute
which limits coverage depending on the
location or status of the insured. Thus,
our uninsured motorist protection is portable. The insured and family members insured are covered not only when occupying
an insured vehicle, but also when in another automobile, when on foot,4 when on a
bicycle or when sitting on a porch. Bradley v. Mid-Century Ins. Co., supra; Mullis v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
supra; Elledge v. Warren, supra; Jacobson v. Implement Dealer Mut Ins. Co.,
supra; Richards v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., supra. Any gaps in uninsured motorist protection dependent on location of the insured should be sanctioned
by the Legislature and not by this Court.
Farmers contends that the Legislature
has impliedly approved of the judicial interpretation of "other vehicle" exclusions by
Owens and progeny by reenacting the Uninsured Motorist Act in substantially the
same language with knowledge of the holdings of these cases. Farmers cites for this
proposition Cagle v. Butcher, 118 Ariz.
122, 575 P.2d 321 (1978) and Jackson v.
Northland Construction Co., I l l Ariz.
387, 531 P.2d 144 (1975). Cagle and Jackson state that when a statute construed by

3- The Court of Appeals also noted that the exclusionary clause had been filed with and approved
by the Insurance Director pursuant to A.R.S.
§ 20-259.01. Such acquiescence, however, does
not divest this Court of its duty to give the
statute its ultimate authoritative interpretation.
See Lindahl v. Howe, supra.

4. We note that the illustration in the Farmers'
policy directly below the heading "Uninsured
Motorist Coverage" depicts an injured pedestrian sprawled on the road after being struck by
what appears to be a hit and run automobile, an
uninsured motor vehicle.
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a court of last resort is reenacted in substantially the same terms, the Legislature
is presumed to have approved the judicial
construction and to have adopted such construction for the reenactment of the statute. Owens and progeny, however, were
decided by the Court of Appeals, and not
the court of last resort in this state, the
Arizona Supreme Court. Thus, this principle has no application to the case at bar.5
Furthermore, that the Legislature has
amended the statute does not mean the
Legislature has considered and adopted the
court's judicial interpretation concerning
the statute. There is no indication of any
legislative action concerning other vehicle
exclusions. We have searched the general
index for the House and Senate for a bill
introduced to the Legislature since the enactment of the Uninsured Motorist Act concerning other vehicle exclusions and have
found none. See General Index: The Journal of the House of Representatives (196584); General Index: Journal of the Senate
(1965-84); Cf. Hosogai v. Kadata, —
Ariz. — , (1985) [No. 17665—PR filed February 20,1985.] We can only infer from the
legislative action taken since the inception
of the Act that the Legislature has considerable concern regarding the uncompensated injuries inflicted by the uninsured motorist. This inference is compelled by several legislative amendments to
§ 20-259.01 which effectively expand rather than limit the scope of coverage provided
by the Act. Cf. Ontiveros v. Borak, 136
Ariz. 500, 667 P.2d 200 (1983) (legislative
enactment of A.R.S. § 4-244 and of new
and stringent laws pertaining to the punishment of drunk drivers shows legislature's concern for damage done by drunk
drivers); Brannigan v. Raybucky 136 Ariz.
513, 516, 667 P.2d 213 (1983) (accord). In
1970, the Act was amended to cover insureds injured by motorists whose vehicles
were uninsured by reason of insolvency,
thus increasing the class of uninsured vehicles. 1970 Ariz.Sess.Laws 195, ch. 80 § 1.
In 1972, the Act was amended making uninsured motorist protection mandatory,
5. Although the Petition for Review was denied
in both Chambers and Rodriguez, such a denial
of review does not mean we accepted the Court

1972 Ariz.Sess.Law 1140, ch. 157 § 1, and
in 1981, uunderinsured motorist" protection
was added. 1981 Ariz.Sess.Law 731, ch.
224 § 1. We, therefore, must construe the
Act until such a time as thQ Legislature
sees fit to voice an opinion on the subject
matter.
We TKIM tlfet tiSe exclusion denying coverage to an insured injured by an uninsured motorist while the insured is occupy,
ing^ a vehicle owned by the insured but not
listed in the policy is invalid as being con-trarj tcLthe coverage mandated by A.R.S.
§"20-259.01. The opinion of the Court of
Appeals is vacated. The Oufens, Chambers and Rodriguez cases aife overruled.
This case is reversed and reminded to the
trial court for proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
HOLOHAN, C.J., and HAYS and CAMERON, JJ., concur.
Note: Justice STANLEY G. FELDMAN
did not participate in the determination of
this matter.
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amination. This Court held that such rules
were invalid because they exceeded the express grant of rulemaking authority conferred upon the board by statute. "Administrative agencies, of course, have only
those powers specifically conferred upon
them by the legislature." 594 P.2d at 332.
Any rule promulgated by an administrative
agency that is "out of harmony" with the
enabling statute will be void. In Bell, we
said:
"The courts have uniformly held that administrative regulations are 'out of harmony' with legislative guidelines if they:
(1) 'engraft additional and contradictory
requirements on the statute' (citing
cases); or (2) 'if they engraft additional,
noncontradictory requirements on the
statute which were not envisioned by the
legislature.' (citing cases)." 594 P.2d at
333.
In Brd. of Barbers, we considered a factual situation somewhat similar to the present
case. In that case, the statute provided
that an applicant serve a one-year apprenticeship before being eligible for licensure
as a barber. By rule, the board added to
this statutory condition a requirement that
the one year apprenticeship must include at
least six months in a "commercial barbershop." We held that the rule imposed an
additional requirement not envisioned by
the legislature and was invalid.
Similarly, courts in other states have
stricken administrative rules which have
added conditions for licensure under grandfather clauses. See Bloom v. Texas State
Bd. of Exam, of Psychologists (Tex. 1973),
492 S.W.2d 460; and Whittle v. St Bd. of
Examiners of Psychologists (Okla.1971), 483
P.2d 328.
The board here has promulgated a rule
clearly imposing an additional requirement
not envisioned by the legislature. The statute requires a master's degree and five
years of professional experience, and prescribes no chronological order in which
these requirements must be met. The legislature knew how to prescribe such a
chronological order. In section 37-17302(2)(e), which deals with the qualifica-

tions of applicants not within the grandfather clause, the statute requires two years
of professional experience and that "One
year of this experience shall be post doctoral." The legislature clearly chose not to
impose a chronological requirement in the
grandfather clause.
The board is statutorily charged with reviewing the character of an applicants professional experience. In its reliance upon
this rule, the board failed to examine the
character of McPhail's experience. Instead,
it denied him a license by promulgation of a
rule "out of harmonjp with the grandfather
clause.
We reverse the judgment of the District
Court and order that the case be remanded
to the board so chat it may consider
McPhail's application on the merits of his
professional experience both before and after he received his master's degree.
HASWELL, C.J., knd DALY, SHEEHY
and WEBER, JJ., concur.

Helen JACOBSON arid Elva J. Dike, Personal Representatives of the Estate of
Sammy D. Harlan, Plaintiff and Respondent,
IMPLEMENT DEALERS MUTUAL INSURANCE CO. and Kenneth Heimer,
Defendant and Appellant
No. 81^226.
Supreme Court of Montana.
Submitted Dec 1, 1981.
Decided Feb 17, 1982.

Personal representatives of estate of
deceased insured brought action against insurer to enforce uninsured motorist cover-
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age of automobile liability insurance policy
issued by insurer. The District Court,
Fourth Judicial District, Missoula County,
James B. Wheelis, P. J., granted summary
judgment in favor of plaintiffs, and defendant insurer appealed. The Supreme Court,
Daly, J., held that policy's exclusion, which
provided that policy did not apply to bodily
injury to insured while occupying automobile, other than insured automobile, owned
by named insured, was invalidated by Montana's mandatory uninsured motorist coverage statute.
Affirmed.
1. Insurance <®=>467.51(3)
Automobile liability insurance policy's
exclusion, which provided that policy did
not apply to bodily injury to insured while
occupying automobile, other than insured
automobile, owned by named insured, was
invalidated by Montana's mandatory uninsured motorist coverage statute, as such
exclusion was violation of public policy behind such statute of protecting policyholders from uninsured motorists in all instances and tried to limit scope of coverage mandated by such statute. MCA 33-23-201.
2. Insurance <s=»467.51(2)
All waivers of uninsured motorist coverage are not improper, but waiver must be
expressed..fciyinsured in manner that is
clear, concise and equitable to both parties
involved in insurance contract.
3. Insurance e=>467.51(3)
Where automobile liability insurance
policy's exclusion clause, which provided
that policy did not apply to bodily injury to
insured while occupying automobile, other
than insured automobile, owned by named
insured, was lost ip myriad of verbiage that
made up insurance contract, and would be
unnoticeable by average policyholder, such
exclusion clause could never constitute express waiver of uninsured motorist coverage.
Worden, Thane & Haines, Robert J. Phillips, Missoula, for defendant and appellant

Garlingtcn, Lohn & Robinson, Paul C.
Meismer, argued, Missoula, for plaintiff and
respondent.
DALY, Justice.
This is an appeal from the District Court
of the Fourth Judicial District of the State
of Montana, in and for the County of Missoula, the Honorable James B. Wheelis presiding. Plaintiffs are the personal representatives of the estate of Sammy D. Harlan, deceased. They commenced this action
in District Court to enforce the uninsured
motorist coverage of an insurance policy
issued by defendant and appellant, Implement Dealers Mutual Insurance Company
(hereinafter IDM), to the plaintiffs' decedent (Harlan). Both parties moved for a
summary judgment on the issue of the
availability of uninsured motorist coverage.
The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. IDM appeals from the summary judgment and requests that this Court reverse the District
Court and grant judgment in its favor on
the basis that there is no coverage available
in this case.
Sammy D. Harlan died as a result of a
motor vehicle accident two and one-half
miles east of Big Timber, Montana, on June
20, 1978, when the 1974 Peterbilt tractortrailer unit which he owned and was driving was involved in a collision with a motor
vehicle driven by Kenneth Heimer. By
stipulation of counsel, Heimer is deemed to
be at fault in Sammy D. Harlan's death.
Heimer had no liability insurance coverage
at the time of the accident.
Harlan had purchased a policy of automobile liability insurance from IDM on a 1971
Ford pickup truck which he owned. This
policy provided for uninsured motorist coverage in the amount of $25,000. The policy
of insurance issued by IDM on the Ford
pickup truck contained an exclusion which
read:
"This policy does not apply under Part
IV:
"(a) to bodily injury to an insured while
occupying an automobile (other than an
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insured automobile) owned by the named
insured or a relative, or through being
struck by such an automobile . . . "
Montana's mandatory uninsured motorist
coverage statute, section 33-23-201, MCA,
requires all motor vehicle liability insurance
policies issued in this state to include uninsured motorist coverage unless the named
insured rejects such coverage.
The statute in question, section 33-23201, MCA, provides:
"Motor vehicle liability policies to include
uninsured motorist coverage—rejection
by insured. (1) No automobile liability or
motor vehicle liability policy insuring
against loss resulting from liability imposed by law for bodily injury or death
suffered by any person arising out of the
ownership, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle shall be delivered or issued for
delivery in this state, with respect to any
motor vehicle registered or principally garaged in this state, unless coverage is
provided therein or supplemental thereto,
in limits for bodily injury or death set
forth in 61-6-103, under provisions filed
with and approved by the commissioner,
for the protection of persons insured
thereunder who are legally entitled to
recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles because
of bodily injury, sickness, or disease, including death, resulting therefrom.
"(2) The named insured shall have the
right to reject such coverage. Unless the
named insured requests such coverage in
writing, such coverage need not be provided in or supplemental to a renewal
policy where the named insured had rejected the coverage in connection with
the policy previously issued to him by the
same insurer."

statute which prohibits this type of exclusion, it is thereby va id. Further, it is argued that if the legislature wished to proscribe this type of exclusion, it would have
done so. Finally, appellant contends that in
the interest of public policy, the exclusion
should be held to be v^lid.
While it is true thlpit courts in several
states have upheld the (validity of exclusion
clauses similar to exclusion (a), the majority
of courts have held similar exclusion clauses
are in conflict with the uninsured motorist
statutes. See, State Farm Automobile Insurance Co. v. Reaves (|1974), 292 Ala. 218,
292 So.2d 95; Mullis v.\state Farm Mutual
Automobile Ins. Co. (Fla.1971), 252 So.2d
229; Bass v. State Farm\Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.
(1973), 128 Ga.App. 285, 196 S.E.2d 485,
modified, 231 Ga. 269, 201 S.E.2d 444; Doxtater v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. (1972), 8 Ill.App.3d 547, 290
N.E.2d 284; State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Robertson (1973), 156 Ind.
App. 149, 295 N.E.2d 626;| Cannon v. American Underwriters, Inc. (1J971), 150 Ind.App.
21, 275 N.E.2d 567; EUedge v. Warren (La.
App.1972), 263 So.2d 912; ~Nygaard v. State
Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. (1974),
301 Minn. 10, 221 N.W.2d 151; State Farm
Mutual Automobile Ins.\ Co. v. Hinkel
(1971), 87 Nev. 478, 488 I^.2d 1151; Bell v.
State Farm Mut Auto. Im. Co. (1974), 157
W.Va. 623, 207 S.E.2d 147; Widiss, A Guide
To Uninsured Motorist Coverage, § 2.9 at
31 (1981).

The^diSHSt^ora^u^
of
exclusion clauses do so on the ground^that
if a statute is silent there ii no reaSftf to
prevent t h e * ^
ttjpthe
insurer.^ Widiss, supra, at 3Q; see also, Rodriquez v. Maryland Indemnity Insurance
Co. (1975), 24 Ariz.App. 391 539 P.2d 196;
[1] One issue is presented to this Court Barton v. American Family Mutual Insurotr-appeal: Did the District Court e r r ^ ance Co. (Mo.App.1972), 485 S.W.2d 628.
holdftfg^Eat the insurance policy's exclusion Regardless of this rationale, this Govt
(a) wariaot a permissible limitation un«l8P elects to follow the majority! position.
There are two ecpr^Uy mmiSTpmiSSm
Appellant contends exclusion (a) is not adopted by the majority of co^rts-hokimg>
invalidated by section 33-23-201, MCA. this type of exclusion ciause to be invalid.
More specifically, appellant argues that be- First, the eicffisiicmarjr dmusj is ineffWtive
cause there is no express provision in the because it t r a c e r the scope of coverage
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required by the statutory mandate. Mullis
v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. (Fla.1971), 252 So.2d 229; ^Allstate
Insurance Company v. Meeks (1967), 207
Va. 897, 153 S.E.2d 222; Federated American Ins/Co. v. Raynes (1977), 88 Wash.2d
439, 563 P.2d 815. In Mullis, the court
stated:
"The public policy of the uninsured motorist statute (Section 627.0851) is to provide uniform and specific insurance benefits to members of the public to cover
damages for bodily injury caused by the
negligence of insolvent or uninsured motorists and such statutorily fixed and prescribed protection is not reducible by insurers' policy exclusions and exceptions
any more than are the benefits provided
for persons protected by automobile liability insurance secured in compliance
with the Financial Responsibility Law.
"Insurers or carriers writing automobile
liability insurance and reciprocal uninsured motorist insurance are not permitted by law to insert provisions in the
policies they issue that exclude or reduce
the liability coverage prescribed by law
for the class of persons insured thereunder who are legally entitled to recover
damages from owners or operators of motor vehicles because of bodily injury."
252 So.2d at 233-234.

ance company incurs by the operation of
the insured vehicle. Also, it is contended
that the risk of a party being injured by an
uninsured motorist increases when a person
is operating a motor vehicle. Therefore,
appellant concludes that an insurer must
attempt to exclude from its coverage any
activity involving a risk for which it cannot
collect a premium or for which the premium
cannot be calculated.

The arguments made by appellant may
be true, and they are certainly reflective of
sound business judgment. However, they
fail to address the underlying purpose and
scope of the uninsured motorist statute.
The court in Elledge v. Warren (La.App.
1972), 263 So.2d 912, when discussing the
purpose of its uninsured motorist statute,
stated:
"The purpose of the statute is to protect
completely, those willing to accept its
protection, from all harm, whatever their
status—passenger, driver, pedestrian—at
the time of injury, produced by uninsured
motorists. The only restrictions are that
the plaintiff must be an insured, the defendant motorist uninsured, and that
plaintiff be legally entitled to recover.
We will not enlarge upon these qualifications and restrict the coverage of such a
socially desirable policy by allowing insurance companies to pursue alleged 'business interests.'
The second, and equally sound, rational^
is that the clause is contrary to the public
" . . . An insurance company may not crepolicy embodied in the statut^ Phillips v.
ate irrational and illusory 'business interMidwest Mutual Insurance Company (1971),
ests' and interpose them as a bar to the
329 F.Supp. 853. The policy behind th(*
comprehensive coverage required by our
statute is to protect the policyholders from
statute." 263 So.2d at 918-919.
uninsured motorists in all instances. $
Appellant's argument that premiums f o i |
In this case, when exclusion (a) is ana- uninsured motorist coverage are somehow
lyzed under either or both of the above risk-related is unfounded. The type of pr^
rationales, it is clear that the exclusion is ay mium charged for uninsured motorist proviolation of public policy and Montana in- tection illustrates the coverage afforded
surance law, and that it tries to limit t
*,The rate is a flat rate, and coverage is
scope of coverage mandated by section 3:
available to everyone at the same rate?
23-201, MCA.*
? The rate is not related to risk.' In this
Appellant alleges that there is a connec- instance, the fact that Harlan had purtion between the automobile which is in- chased uninsured motorist coverage for only
sured and the uninsured motorist coverage. one vehicle and paid a premium on this
It is contended that the connection is based vehicle does not give rise to the exclusion of
upon the additional risk which the insur- coverage on any other owned vehicles. In
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other words, the importance or value of the
imputed business purpose for this exclusion
seems tenuous as applied to the purchaser
who owns more than one vehicle. Acquisition of insurance for a second vehicle, especially with premiums that are not risk-related, is relatively inexpensive; therefore, permitting the insurer to withhold coverage
for the small return seems of dubious merit.
Widiss, supra, § 2.9 at 29.
There is no requirement that the insured
be occupying an insured vehicle. Therefore, there is no connection between the
insured and the automobile listed on the
policy. The named automobile merely illustrates that the person has satisfied the legal
requirement of purchasing insurance and
has uninsured motorist coverage unless expressly waived. Montana's uninsured motorist coverage is personal and portable.
This point was exemplified by the court in
Bradley v. Mid-Century Ins. Co. (1980), 409
Mich. 1, 294 N.W.2d 141, when it held:
"We conclude that once uninsured motorist coverage is purchased, the insured and
his relatives insured for liability have uninsured motorist protection under all circumstances. Uninsured motorist coverage, like no-fault coverage, is personal
and portable.
" . . They are insured when injured in an
owned vehicle named in the policy, in an
owned,vehicle not named in the policy, in
an unowned vehicle, on a motorcycle, on a
bicycle, whether afoot or on horseback or
even on a pogo stick/' 294 N.W.2d at
152.
[2,3] It must be emphasized that all
vaivers of uninsured motorist coverage are
lot improper. The waiver must be expressed by the insured in a manner that is
lear, concise and equitable to both parties
lvolved in the insurance contract. The
xclusion clause in question in this case does
ot satisfy this requirement. The Washigton Supreme Court, in Federated Ameriin Ins. Co. v. Raynes (1977), 88 Wash.2d
19, 563 P.2d 815, when discussing an exclum clause similar to that presented here,
ated:
". .. R.C.W. 48.22.030 mandates uninsured motorist coverage 'for the protection of persons insured* under the policy,

unless the named insured rejects such
coverage . . . the parties may agree to a
narrow definition of insured so long as
that definition is applied consistently
throughout the policy, but once it is determined that a person is ^n insured under the policy, that person is entitled to
uninsured motorist coverage. Respondent is a named insured in if.A.I.'s policy.
Exclusion (b) does not narrdw the definition of insured so as to exclude from
being an insured under the policy. Rather, the exclusion merely excludes coverage when the insured is injured in a
certain situation, i.e., occupying a car
owned by him but not insurjed by F.A.I.
This attempt to exclude coverage for an
insured is impermissible under R.C.W.
48.22.030." 563 P.2d at 818.
See also, Chaffee v. USF&G\ (1979), 181
Mont. 1, 591 P.2d 1102, 36 St.Rep. 398.
The exclusion clause in the IlpM policy is
lost in the myriad of verbiage | that makes
up the insurance contract. Thi^ particular
exclusion clause would be unnckticeable by
the average policyholder and can, therefore,
never constitute an express waiver.
The judgment of the District Court is
affirmed.
HASWELL, C. J., and HARRISON,
SHEA, SHEEHY, MORRISON (and WEBER, J J., concur.
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